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Chapter 2. Market-oriented Reform of China’s IPO System 
and Information Disclosure Regulations 
Chen Su 
Newcastle University Business School, 5 Barrack, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 4SE, UK 
Yu Jing 
Hohai University Business School 
Reform of the issuance system of new shares is at the core of China’s stock market development. The 
reform can enhance issuance efficiency, strengthen price discovery for stocks, optimize resource 
allocation and is of great significance for the sound development and further improvement of the stock 
market. China’s IPO system, plagued with inherent flaws, has always been controversial; but it keeps 
evolving and improving. This chapter discusses reform and evolution of China’s IPO system from three 
perspectives: The regulatory system, issuance procedures, and pricing methods. Based on discussion and 
analyses, it concludes that China’s IPO system should graduate from an administrative approach to a 
market and law-based one. This is based on both theoretical logic and market realities. This chapter also 
conducts case studies of China’s IPO practice, and 1,351 listed company that have undertaken IPOs 
between 1992 and 2007 are used as samples to discuss how market-oriented reform of the IPO system 
influences pricing efficiency. According to the case studies, China’s IPO system reform has given 
underwriters more choices and more pricing power, thus curbing excessive underpricing and enhancing 
the long-term performance of IPO companies. This chapter also points out that the most prominent 
problem during issuance of new shares is information disclosure noncompliance. Taking Yunnan 
Greenland Biological Technology Co., LTD and Wanfu Biotechnology as examples, this chapter analyzes 
problems in China’s IPO information disclosure regulatory system. Particular problems include light 
penalties for listing fraud, absence of a civil compensation mechanism, an exit mechanism with no actual 
functions, and so on. Suggestions are put forward accordingly: Strengthening punishments for securities 
frauds, improving judicial procedures for civil compensation in listing fraud, prioritizing civil 
compensation, and introducing a compulsory suspension system to clear fraudulent companies out of the 
market. All studies and research done have proved that China’s IPO system reform should be conducted 
in a well-phased and gradual manner, and that the registration system should be put in place at the right 
time, so that China’s IPO system can work in line with those in developed market economies. 
2.1 The journey of market-oriented reform of the IPO system 
2.1.1 Evolution of China’s IPO regulatory system 
The development of China’s IPO regulatory system has traversed three phases: An Administrative 
Review and Approval System with quota management at its core; an approval system based on the 
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Channel System; and an approval system based on a sponsor system. Brief introductions to these systems 
and their features will aid in understanding the evolution of China’s IPO regulatory system. 
2.1.1.1 Administrative Review and Approval System centered upon quota management 
From 1990 to 2001, China’s securities market was just restored and IPOs were regulated by the 
Administrative Review and Approval System (Quota Approval System) where stock issuance was 
reviewed and approved by administrative authorities. There were three steps of review and approval: 
(1) Quota allocation 
Securities authorities determine the aggregate issuance volume according to the overall national economic 
development planning and industrial policies, and then distribute the quota to government departments 
and provinces. These departments and provinces distribute their quota to companies. 
(2) Pre-selection 
After the issuance quota or the number of issuers is determined, local governments or government 
departments select companies that have filed applications to be pre-selected companies and report to the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for review and approval. 
(3) Approval of issuance 
To be approved, companies must go through preliminary examination and review. First, the staff at the 
Department of Public Offering (under the CSRC) conduct a preliminary examination of recommended 
issuers; reviews are in the charge of the Public Offering Review Committee set up by the CSRC. 
Quota management was implemented from 1993 to 1995. It worked like this: The securities 
authority under the State Council determines in advance the total quota, and then distributes it to 
provinces and industries according to their needs. Provinces then select stock issuers within the limited 
quota. During this period, the accumulated quota of share issuance reached 10.5 billion shares. There 
were two quota allocations: 5 billion in 1993 and 5.5 billion in 1995. Two hundred companies issued 
shares, raising more than CNY40 billion. From 1996 to 2000, target management was put in place. Under 
this regulation, the aggregate issuance is controlled and the number of issuers is limited. The securities 
authority under the State Council determines the number of companies to be listed during a certain period 
of time, and sets targets for provincial governments and industrial management departments, who then 
recommend pre-selected companies to the securities authority. Qualified pre-selected companies then 
have to submit official applications for share issuance to the securities authority for review and approval. 
In 1996 and 1997, 15 and 30 billion shares were issued, respectively. More than 700 companies issued 
their stock, raising more than CNY400 billion. On 1 July 1999, the Securities Law took effect. According 
to the Securities Law, ‘the securities authority under State Council is in charge of approving applications 
for stock issuance according to legal conditions’. The Approval System was thus introduced. Though 
issuance targets were no longer determined, the targets set in 1997 were effective till 2001. 
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The characteristics of the Administrative Review and Approval System are as follows: 
(1) Quota management 
The total stock issuance quota across the country is first determined by the CSRC and State Planning 
Commission, and then distributed to local governments and central departments. It is noteworthy that the 
issuance quota is calculated based on par value. Thus, when shares are issued at a premium, the amount of 
funding raised outstrips the quota by a large margin. 
(2) Two levels of review and approval 
Issuers submit quota applications to the local governments or central departments in charge. After 
approval by this first level, applications are then submitted to the CSRC for review and approval. 
(3) Incremental offering 
Only newly-issued public shares can access secondary market circulation. 
Limitations of the Administrative Review and Approval System are also distinct. First, the system 
reflects the mentality of a planned economy and runs counter to market logic. As a result, financing 
opportunities for strong companies are impaired, and the prosperity of the securities market is constricted. 
Second, the system is overly dependent on administrative procedures. Third, the review and approval 
procedures are not open and transparent enough, making it easy for backroom deals, rent-seeking and 
rent-setting. The role of the market in adjusting resource allocation is not given full play. In particular, the 
listing of many inferior companies seriously harms investor interests. 
As rational economic actors, underwriters aim to maximize their own interests. Under the 
Administrative Review and Approval System, they are not subject to accountability and are immune from 
punishments related to the poor quality of listed companies, so a wrong signal is given to underwriters 
that they only need to do their best to help companies acquire issuance quotas and complete listing. There 
is not enough attention paid to the quality of issuers. Without incentives and disincentives, underwriter 
credibility plays little role in the system. 
2.1.1.2 Approval System based on the Channel System 
When drawbacks to the Administrative Review and Approval System were found, China reformed the 
IPO system. In March 2001, the Channel and Approval System replaced the Administrative Review and 
Approval System. The Channel and Approval System was adopted to correct speculative behaviors on the 
part of underwriters and to guide them to pay more attention to quality instead of quantity. 
After the implementation of the Approval System, the CSRC is still the legally authorized 
approval authority for issuance of new shares. But part of the approval authority has been shifted to 
underwriters. For example, underwriters are empowered to decide issuance volume, issuance method and 
issue price (which used to be an exclusive responsibility of the CSRC). In addition, companies applying 
for an IPO must be tutored and trained by intermediaries for a year. 
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Under the Approval System, as long as companies meet the requirements stipulated by the 
Securities Law and the Company Law, no approval from local governments is needed. But issuers are 
obliged to disclose information; securities authorities have the power to veto stock issuance applications 
that do not meet certain requirements. The Channel System is an implementation method of the Approval 
System: The CSRC grants underwriters a certain amount of shares to be issued (the number of channels) 
every year. The number of channels – ranging from two to eight – depends on the size of underwriters. 
The CSRC evaluates the quality of underwriters’ work every year to determine whether to suspend or 
reduce the channels they hold. 
The Channel and Approval System has made improvements on the former system. First, issuance 
quotas were canceled. Second, companies have to conduct shareholding reform and be listed for a year 
before issuing shares. Third, government approval is replaced by underwriter recommendation. After 
applications are approved by provincial governments or departments under the State Council, leading 
underwriters recommend issuers to the CSRC for review and approval. During the process, local 
governments and the securities authority are no longer involved. Fourth, underwriters are encouraged to 
supervise the quality of issuers. Only when listed companies meet requirements of quality evaluations set 
by the CSRC can underwriters sustain their businesses. In this way, underwriters are motivated to 
improve quality management and intensify their risk controls. Accordingly, the quality of the issuance 
business has been enhanced. 
As the securities market grows and matures, problems in the Approval System have begun to 
surface. In the first place, the Channel System is, in its nature, a type of quota allocation. Limited 
numbers of channels hamper the development of the underwriter issuance business. Though the system 
works well in restraining the financing impulse of companies, it impedes competition within the same 
industry. The Channel System also grants underwriters a monopoly over channels, so they may engage in 
improper trading such as asking issuers to bid for channels. Additionally, while the Approval System 
emphasizes legal liability of underwriters more than the former system, it is still inadequate in this regard: 
Underwriters are only subject to liabilities during listing recommendation, and they shoulder no guarantee 
responsibility. All responsibilities terminate after companies are listed. As a consequence, reverse 
encouragement is delivered, making underwriters more focused on maximizing intrinsic interests and less 
motivated to supervise issuers. 
2.1.1.3 Approval System based on Sponsor System 
The Interim Measures on the Sponsor System for Securities Public Offerings, released by the CSRC, took 
effect on February 1st, 2004 – a signal of the establishment of the Sponsor System. The Sponsor System 
features the following characteristics. 
First, a registration management system for sponsors and sponsor representatives is set up. The 
Interim Measures on the Sponsor System for Securities Public Offerings puts forward a ‘double sponsor’ 
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requirement for listing: Companies to be listed must be sponsored; professionals bearing sponsor 
representative certificates must be in charge of the specific sponsor work of companies. 
Second, the time limit of sponsoring is specified. There are two aspects of sponsorship: 
Recommendation and continuous guidance and supervision. The recommendation period starts from the 
time of the CSRC’s acceptance of the company’s application documents to completion of the company’s 
listing. For an IPO, the guidance and supervision period refers to the remaining time of the year of listing, 
and the following two complete accounting years. 
Third, sponsor responsibilities are stipulated. Before sponsors and sponsor representatives 
recommend companies for listing to the CSRC, they tutor and conduct due diligence of issuers. They 
ensure (or are assured) that documents submitted to the CSRC contain no false records, misleading 
statements or major omissions. They also ensure the quality of information disclosure, the independence 
of issuer and its capability for sustained operation in the recommendation documents. 
Fourth, credibility supervision and ‘cold shoulder’ supervision are put in place. According to the 
Interim Measures on the Sponsor System for Securities Public Offerings, illegal practices and foul play by 
sponsors and sponsor representatives are subject to administrative penalties and held accountable by law. 
Further, such sponsors and sponsor representatives will be put under ‘cold shoulder’ supervision: 
Depending on the seriousness of their case, their recommendation for listing will not be accepted during a 
certain period of time. In serious cases, their sponsor certificates are revoked. The Interim Measures on 
the Sponsor System for Securities Public Offerings also stipulates that any poor credit history of sponsors 
and sponsor representatives must be recorded and published. 
The Sponsor System has the most direct and notable influence on underwriters. Under the former 
IPO system, when selecting issuance projects, underwriters prioritized profits and paid little attention to 
the quality of issuers. As long as listings went well, underwriters could take in handsome profits, and their 
responsibilities were not commensurate with their gains. However, under the Sponsor System, 
underwriters have to maintain close connection with listed companies in the following two years after 
listing. As an important communication bridge between listed companies, exchanges, and the CSRC, 
underwriters are responsible for identifying information that should be disclosed and urging listed 
companies to disclose it according to CSRC regulations. Besides, they should make use of their 
professional expertise to provide listed companies with counseling on investment, wealth management 
and capital operations. They should also aid companies in improving their corporate governance. If 
sponsors fail to discharge their duties, they will be subject to a host of administrative penalties or even 
judicial procedures, such as suspension of their sponsor certificate. Such high stakes greatly restrain and 
incentivize underwriters. 
2.1.2 Evolution of China’s IPO procedures 
China’s IPO procedures have evolved over four phases. 
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2.1.2.1 Offline issuance 
Prior to 1995, all of China’s IPOs were undertaken offline through methods such as subscription 
warrants, savings certificates, or ratio placement. 
(1)Issuance through subscription warrants 
In the case of issuance through subscription warrants, subscription warrants (or subscription forms) are 
sold to investors. Then many of these are drawn in a lottery; investors subscribe for shares with 
subscription warrants that are drawn from this lottery. This method offers limited issuance of subscription 
warrants, but unlimited issuance of subscription warrants. 
Between 1991 and 1992, limited subscription warrants were used in share issuance. The total 
number of warrants was announced before subscription warrants were sold. Investors could buy a limited 
number of warrants, after which a lottery determined which warrant codes were permitted to buy shares. 
Each drawn warrant could buy the stipulated number of shares at the designated price. In August 1992, 
Shenzhen used this method when issuing stocks for 13 listed companies. At that time, the Shenzhen 
government announced issuance of five million subscription warrants. Each warrant was sold at CNY100 
and each person could buy ten warrants with their identity card. The winning rate was 10 per cent. Due to 
grave undersupply, investors from across the country rushed to Shenzhen to buy warrants. The selling 
was poorly organized, and some staff bought warrants in private. The chaos gave rise to the ‘August 10th 
Incident’, and this method has not been used since. 
In 1993, the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System rolled out the unlimited 
issuance of subscription warrants as a way of issuing new shares. Supply was no longer limited and each 
investor could buy an unlimited number of warrants. Winning rates were calculated by actual sales of 
warrants and issuance volume of shares. Then lots were drawn to determine chosen warrant codes. Each 
drawn code could buy a certain number of shares. This method sidestepped major defects of the limited 
system and embodied the principle of openness, fairness and equality. But as the subscription volume was 
uncertain, actual subscription costs of many shares outstripped issue price, impacting the secondary 
market. The costs of unlimited issuance of subscription warrants were determined by the winning rate. 
Normally, warrants were sold for CNY2 to CNY5 each. Warrants not chosen were also included when 
calculating costs. Each chosen warrant could buy 200 to 500 shares, and shares were priced at a high 
premium. Due to strong purchase motivation, winning rates tended to be very low, raising the costs for 
buying shares. 
(2) Issuance through savings certificates 
To solve problems related to the unlimited issuance of subscription warrants, the Securities Committee of 
the State Council promulgated Measures of Share Issuance and Subscription, which stipulated that 
issuances could be pegged to bank savings deposits. 
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Issuance through savings certificates is a way of issuing shares where savings certificates are 
issued and a lottery is then used to determine buyers. During the recruitment period, underwriters sell an 
unlimited number of special time certificates of deposit to investors through designated banks. Then the 
winning rate is determined based on the number of certificates sold, the approved issuance volume of 
shares and the number of shares subscribed by each certificate. An open lottery is issued to determine 
investors. This method can cut extra fees generated by subscription warrants, but deposits have to be 
made during the process, which demands large amounts of cash flow. Safety risks exist in this method. 
Issuance through savings certificates falls into two kinds: Special certificates and deposits in full amounts. 
(3) Issuance through ratio placement 
According to Opinions on Share Issuance and Subscription, promulgated by the CSRC on 20 October 
1995, share issuance could be pegged to bank savings deposits, and ratio placement was recommended. 
Ratio placement is further categorized into two types: Advance payment in full, ratio placement 
and balance repayment; advance payment in full, ratio placement and balance re-deposit. In case of the 
former method, during the designated subscription period, investors deposit subscription money in the 
full amount into special accounts opened by the underwriters in the recipient banks. After subscription, 
the special accounts are frozen. After verification of this money is received and subscriptions are 
confirmed valid, a placement ratio is calculated based on the issue volume of shares and subscription 
volume. Then placement is made, and the balance is returned to investors. The other kind of ratio 
placement works in the same way, the only difference being that the balance after subscription is re-
deposited at the deposit rate of banks in the same period. Such special deposits cannot be deposited or 
withdrawn in advance. 
2.1.2.2 Online bidding issuance 
Online bidding issuance takes place through the trading systems of exchanges. A leading underwriter is 
the sole seller of new shares, and the floor price is the issue bottom price announced by the issuer. 
Investors bid for subscriptions during the designated period of time. Issuers and leading underwriters 
determine issue price in line with price priority and make placements. The price unit of subscription is 
CNY0.1. Each stock account must pay for the subscription in full in advance. From June 1994 to January 
1995, four companies – Harbin Shirble Electric-heat Co., Ltd, Qinghai Sanpu Pharmaceutical Limited, 
Xiahua Electronics Co., Ltd and Qiong Jin Pan (now known as ‘Haima Investment Co., Ltd’) – tried this 
way. Due to market immaturity, a lack of price discovery capability and poor transparency, new share 
subscriptions became too speculative – a vivid example of the Greater Fool Theory. In the end, the former 
three companies sold all their shares at prices respectively 38 per cent, 167 per cent and 141 per cent 
above their bottom prices. But on the first day of listing, their shares fell below the issue price. Qiong Jin 
Pan only sold 47.3 per cent of its shares; the rest were underwritten a by leading underwriter. Online 
bidding issuance has never been used after February 1995. 
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2.1.2.3 Online pricing issuance 
From 1995 to 2001, IPOs in China were primarily undertaken through online pricing issuance. In this 
case, issuers and underwriters set the issue price beforehand. The leading underwriter – the sole ‘seller’ of 
new shares – sells shares at the set price through trading systems of exchanges. During the designated 
period of time, investors make subscriptions in the same way as buying shares on secondary markets. 
Subscriptions made by each account must be an integral multiple of 1000. Then underwriters draw lots 
based on issue volume and subscription. Subscriptions made by lottery winners are made active. 
Such an issuance procedure is plagued by the following limitations: (1) While the lottery seems 
fair, like roulette, it depends on luck. (2) As there are limits on subscription for each account, many major 
and institutional investors managed to open hundreds or even thousands of accounts through the black 
market (or by buying fake identity cards). As a result, equity is snapped up by people who open accounts 
illegally. (3) As most subscription funds gain through short-term financing, shares are traded frequently 
after the initial offering, causing price fluctuations. 
2.1.2.4 Online placement plus offline placement 
From 1999 till 2014 and onwards, China’s IPOs have been using online issuance and offline placement. 
In July 1999, the CSRC released the Circular on Further Improving Share Issuance Methods and 
rolled out a method combining online issuance and placement to legal persons. In August, the Circular on 
Placement to Legal Persons was released by the CSRC, which stated the procedures for legal person 
placement. Issuers and lead underwriters determine issue volume and bottom issue price beforehand, send 
inquiries to legal person investors, and finalize issue price according to subscriptions made by the legal 
person investors. Placement for legal persons and online public offering is of the same price. When issue 
volume is above 80 million shares, placement to legal person investors must be no more than 50 per cent 
of total issue volume. When issue volume is more than 200 million shares, the proportion of legal person 
placement may be increased according to the market situation. When issue volume stands under 
80 million shares, this method is not recommended. But if issuers and leading underwriters insist on 
making offerings this way, a ‘carry-back mechanism’ must be put in place. Under this mechanism, 
placements to legal persons are determined by the retail investors’ over-subscription multiplier. 
To support the fund industry, on 11 August 1998, the CSRC released the Circular on Issues 
concerning New Share Placement to Securities Investment Funds. It stipulated that securities investment 
funds may apply for new shares placement, and that new shares (of which public offering was over 
50 million shares) may make placement to securities. In November 1999, more subscription privileges 
were granted for funds: New shares for which public offering was no less than 50 million shares must 
provide no less than 20 per cent of the public offering for fund subscription application. The capital 
allotment for new share placement of each fund was also increased from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. On 5 
April 2000, a circular issued by the CSRC allowed companies whose post-listing equity was below 
400 million to place new shares to legal persons. As investors regarded that funds enjoyed privileges 
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unfairly and that the principles of openness, fairness and equity were violated, in May 2000, the privileges 
of funds in securing new share placement were abolished. 
In February 2000, the CSRC rolled out the Circular on Issues Concerning New Share Placement 
to Investors in Secondary Market. It regulated the practice of new share placement in the secondary 
market. When issuing stocks, issuers and leading underwriters allot a certain proportion of shares from 
the online public offering into placement to investors in the secondary market. Investors may subscribe 
for shares within the subscription limit. The limit is calculated by two variables: The market cap of 
securities in circulation (based on the closing price of held securities on the trading day before the release 
of summary prospectus), and the designated conversion coefficient. Securities exchanges allot serial 
numbers to valid subscriptions – one per thousand shares. Leading underwriters then hold a lottery to 
select numbers. Securities exchanges then withhold stock capital from the capital accounts of investors 
whose subscription number wins. If investors fail to subscribe for new shares due to a lack of funds, then 
it is assumed that said investors renounce their right to subscribe and the shares are underwritten by the 
leading underwriters. 
On 7 September 2004, the CSRC released the Circular on Issues Concerning the Trial 
Implementation of an Inquiry System for Initial Public Offerings of Shares. It stipulated that issuers and 
their sponsors must place shares to investors that have participated in price inquiries and biddings. The 
specific procedures were stated as follows: Placement of shares for which the public offering stands 
below 400 million shares must be no more than 20 per cent of the total issue volume. Placement of shares 
of which public offering stands at or on 400 million shares must be no more than 50 per cent of the total 
issue volume. 
On 11 September 2006, the Measures for the Administration of Securities Issuance and 
Underwriting released by the CSRC stated for the first time that IPOs may be undertaken through 
placement to strategic investors, offline placement to inquiry objects (that is special institutional 
investors) and online issuance. It contained specific regulations. First, IPOs with an issue volume above 
400 million shares may make placements to strategic investors, and the investors must hold the shares for 
at least 12 months as committed. Second, special institutional investors (inquiry objects) and securities 
investment products managed by them (objects of share placements) may take part in offline placements. 
Placements of IPOs with an issue volume under 200 million shares must be no more than 20 per cent of 
the total issue volume. In the case of IPOs with an issue volume of over 400 million shares, placement 
must be no more than 50 per cent of the remaining issue volume, after placements to strategic investors. 
Inquiry objects must hold shares through offline placement for at least 3 months as committed. Third, 
issuers and leading underwriters must make public offerings to public investors in parallel with offline 
placement. Among shares placed to strategic investors, the amount of shares with no holding time limit 
must be no less than 25 per cent of all the shares issued at that offering. 
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According to the Measures for the Administration of Securities Issuance and Underwriting, for 
IPOs above the designated volume, issuers and their leading underwriters must establish a carry-back 
mechanism between offline placement and online issuance so that the ratio between the two can be 
adjusted according to subscriptions. For IPOs above 400 million shares, the issuer and its leading 
underwriter may include an over-allotment option in the issuance scheme. 
In May 2012, the CSRC issued Decisions on Revising Measures for the Administration of 
Securities Issuance and Underwriting. This document made some changes, based on the former 
Measures. First, in principle, shares placed to inquiry objects by issuers and underwriters must be no less 
than 50 per cent of the sum of all new shares in the public offering and old shares transferred. Second, the 
three-month holding limit for inquiry objects was abolished. Instead, inquiry objects, issuers and 
underwriters may agree upon the holding limit of shares through online placement on their own. Third, 
IPOs may establish a carry-back mechanism irrespective of the issue volume. Also, when the offline 
winning rate is two to four times that of the online winning rate, issuers and underwriters must carry 
10 per cent of share placement from offline placement back to online placement (when the offline 
winning rate is more than four times greater, 20 per cent must be carried back). 
2.1.3 Evolution of China’s IPO pricing methods 
The evolution of China’s IPO pricing methods roughly falls into four phases. 
2.1.3.1 Price–Earning ratio pricing 
Before the Securities Law came into effect in 1999, IPO pricing was determined via the price–earning 
ratio (P/E ratio). The issue price of shares was determined by after-tax profits per share and a 
comparatively fixed price–earning ratio: Issue price = after-tax profits per share × IPO P/E ratio. The P/E 
ratio in the equation was determined by the CSRC (it normally ranged between 13 and 20). 
Before 1996, the price–earning ratio pricing model was adopted: 
Issue price of shares = predicted after-tax profits of the year of issuance ÷ total post-listing equity 
× P/E ratio. 
Since 1997, in an attempt to regulate the issue price of shares and enhance corporate operational 
performance, the equation was revised: 
Issue price of shares = the sum of after-tax profits in the three years prior to IPO ÷ 
sum of total equity in the three years prior to IPO × P/E ratio. 
A revision was made again in September 1997: 
After-tax profit per share = after-tax profit per share in the year prior to issuance × 70 per cent + 
predicted after-tax profit per share after dilution × 30 per cent, 
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P/E ratio = maximum P/E ratio set in the period − (maximum average closing price of industry-
classified listed companies in the 30 days prior to the day of calculation) × adjustment coefficient + 
correction, 
Coefficient = (maximum P/E ratio set in the period − minimum P/E ratio set in the period) ÷ 
(maximum average closing price of industry-classified listed companies in the 30 days prior to the day of 
calculation − minimum average closing price of industry-classified listed companies in the 30 days prior 
to the day of calculation). 
The above-mentioned equations used ‘complete dilution’ when determining after-tax profit per share. 
That is, after-tax profit per share was determined by dividing the total post-listing equity by the total 
predicted after-tax profits in the year of issuance. 
As share issuance generally did not occur on the beginning date of each year, capital received at 
different times over the year had different influences on corporate performance. In March 1998, IPO 
pricing started to use a weighted average method to calculate after-tax profit per share. The equation was 
as follows: 
Annual after-tax profit per share = monthly after-tax profit per share after listing × 12 months 
and… 
Monthly after-tax profit per share after listing = total post-listing after-tax profits of the company 
÷ remaining months of the year after the month of listing ÷ total post-listing equity of the company. 
2.1.3.2 Accumulated bidding pricing 
It was stipulated by the 1999 Securities Law that the issue price of shares is determined by issues and 
underwriters through consultation. This was a signal that China had made a stride forward towards a 
market-oriented pricing mechanism in the securities market. The later Circular on Further Improving 
Methods of Issuing Shares specified pricing methods for shares in Article 6: (1) Issuers and leading 
underwriters may set a range for the issue price and report it to the CSRC for review and approval. (2) 
The final issue price must be decided after the subscription contracts of placement objects are learned 
about through promotions such as question-and-answers sessions. (3) The final issue price must be within 
the price range (including the ceiling and floor price) approved by the CSRC. Otherwise, the final price 
must be reported to the CSRC again for review and approval. As can be seen from the Circular, the issue 
price of new shares may go beyond the price range, but the margin is not specified. Accumulated bidding 
was introduced in the market as an innovative way of pricing new share issues. In 2001, the Guiding 
Opinions on Price Bidding of Online New Share Placement rolled out by the CSRC described the 
accumulated bidding pricing model. 
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According to the Guiding Opinions, the issue price of new shares must be determined by issuers 
and leading underwriters based on the market situation by the following ways (or other ways in line with 
requirements). 
(1)Subscription multiplier pricing 
After subscriptions are made, securities exchanges count subscription volumes cumulatively. When the 
accumulative volume reaches the deduction proportion – no less than 10 per cent – by issuers and leading 
underwriters beforehand, the price at this point is regarded as the critical price. Subscriptions made at 
prices higher than the critical price are invalid. Next, securities exchanges rank all subscriptions at prices 
over the critical price in descending order, based on the over-subscription multiplier (set and published by 
issuers and leading underwriters beforehand). When the cumulative subscription at a certain price 
surpasses the issue volume represented by the over-subscription multiplier, the price is the issue price of 
new shares. 
(2) Base price model 
First, subscriptions are made, and issuers and leading underwriters set and release a base price 
beforehand. Then the price range is expanded, centering upon the base price with CNY0.10 as a change 
bracket. Such expansion continues until the cumulative subscription reaches the planned issue volume. 
Subscriptions at prices within the price range (including ceiling and floor prices) are all regarded as valid. 
The final issue price is set below the critical price (the floor price) of the base price range. Median price, 
arithmetic average price and weighted average price can be used to set the base price. 
(3) Bidding pricing 
First subscriptions are made. Then the leading underwriters rank all subscription price biddings in 
descending order. When cumulative subscriptions at a certain price level reach the issue volume, the price 
is set as the final issue price. 
2.1.3.3 Controlled P/E ratio pricing 
In the latter half of 2001, state shares decreased and the stock market slumped dramatically. Almost all 
new shares issued at prices set by market-based approaches fell below the closing price on their first day 
of listing. Many shares even fell under the issue price, exposing investors to the grave risk of overpriced 
share offerings. Authorities also took note of flaws in market-based share issuance. So, in the latter half of 
2001, the controlled P/E ratio was reinstated in IPO pricing. 
This time, the approach made adjustments to the traditional P/E ratio pricing model. First, the 
shift range of the price bracket was about 10 per cent. Second, the P/E ratio was no more than 20. 
Securities firms and issuers can only set the issue price of shares through cumulative bidding and inquiry 




2.1.3.4 Inquiry pricing 
On 10 December 2004, the CSRC promulgated the Circular on Several Issues Concerning Trial 
Implementation of Inquiry System in IPOs. According to the Circular, starting from 1 January 2005, IPO 
companies and their sponsors must set the issue price of shares through inquiry. Approval by CSRC is no 
longer needed. The release of the Circular (and its accompanying document, No.18 Memorandum of 
Share Issuance Approval Standards – Requirements for Supervising Conditions and Behaviors of IPO 
Inquiry Objects) marked the entrance of China’s IPO inquiry system for IPO pricing. Under the inquiry 
system, IPO companies and their sponsors must set the issue price of shares through making inquiries to 
institutional investors. Two steps are involved: Preliminary inquiry and cumulative bidding inquiry. In the 
preliminary inquiry, issuers and sponsors make preliminary inquiries to some of the institutions to 
determine the price range of the IPO. In the cumulative bidding inquiry, issuers and sponsors make 
cumulative bidding inquiries to all institutional investors to ascertain their subscription, set the issue price 
and make placements at subscribed volume to institutions. The rest of the shares are offered to public 
investors online at the same issue price. 
On September 11th, 2006, the CSRC published the Measures for the Administration of Securities 
Issuance and Underwriting, which stipulated that the issue price of IPOs must be set through making 
inquiries to designated institutional investors. Institutional investors (that is, inquiry objects) mentioned 
by the Measures refer to securities investment and fund management companies, securities firms, trust 
and investment companies, financial companies, insurance institutional investors, qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII) and other institutional investors approved by the CSRC. The inquiry in 
question consists of both a preliminary inquiry and a cumulative bidding inquiry. Issuers and their leading 
underwriters set the range of the issue price through the preliminary inquiry, and determine the issue price 
(within the set price range) through the cumulative bidding inquiry. The establishment of the inquiry 
system was another step made in share pricing towards market-oriented pricing. But it was by nature a 
strategic game of investors versus issuers. The system may result in investors underpricing share 
purchases. It fails to give full play to the market’s role, driving the issue price of shares away from market 
equilibrium. 
To curb problems like underpriced subscriptions and overpriced placement, overpriced 
subscription and default, and overpriced subscription and under-placement, on 11 June 2009, the CSRC 
rolled out the Guiding Opinions on Further Reforming and Improving the Issuance System of New Shares 
to improve the pricing mechanism. The Opinions relaxed window guidance, leaving more freedom in 
pricing for issuers and leading underwriters. Driven by profits, they will raise the issue price of their own 
accord. At the same time, an elimination system is introduced in the preliminary inquiry. Investors that 
fail to make valid biddings in the preliminary inquiry are not eligible to participate in the following 
cumulative bidding inquiry, rooting out underpriced subscriptions and high-priced placements. In 
addition, institutions that have provided valid subscription prices in the preliminary inquiry have to 
participate in the cumulative bidding inquiry and subscriptions. In this way, investors cannot first make 
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high biddings and then default later. Lastly, the total subscription volume must be no less than the 
planned subscription volume corresponding to the valid price bidding made in the preliminary inquiry. 
Thus investors cannot make subscriptions and then buy a smaller volume. In summary, this reform of the 
inquiry system has reduced the rate of IPO underpricing. 
In May 2012, the CSRC released the Decisions on Revising the Measures for the Administration 
of Securities Issuance and Underwriting. New changes were made based on the Measures: (1) An IPO 
may set the issue price by making inquiries to institutions, or issuers and leading underwriters may set the 
issue price by consultation. Other legal and feasible ways may also be adopted. (2) The scope of inquiry 
objects is expanded: Institutional investors with strong pricing capabilities and long-term investment 
intentions, as well as individual investors with rich experience, are included. (3) After the prospectus is 
published, issuers and leading underwriters may communicate with certain inquiry objects non-publicly 
and learn about their pricing intentions so as to make predictions about the price range. Other reasonable 
ways may also be used to forecast the range of the issue price. (4) When the inquiry system is used for 
pricing, issuers and leading underwriters may set the issue price according to the results of the 
preliminary inquiry. Alternatively, they may set the range of the issue price through the preliminary 
inquiry and then set the issue price itself (within the range of the issue price) through the cumulative 
bidding inquiry. 
2.1.4 Market and law-oriented reform of the IPO system 
On 30 November 2013, the CSRC released its Opinions on Further Deepening the IPO System Reform. 
The Opinions emphasized the role of the market and legal framework in the IPO system, highlighted its 
supervision philosophy centered upon information disclosure, strengthened information disclosure proper, 
and set more transparent examinations and review standards. According to the Opinions, the process of 
examination and review was also to be made public. Transparency at various levels and links in the IPO 
helps guarantee the accessibility of public supervision throughout the process. The Opinions is a 
monumental step in the gradual transition from an approval to a registration system. It is a vivid 
embodiment of the principles of an accelerated shift in supervisory modes, giving full play to the decisive 
role of the market, upholding a fair market, and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of 
investors – especially medium- and small-scale investors. 
2.1.4.1 Moving towards a registration system: Information disclosure lies at the core of 
strengthened supervision 
The Opinions stresses a supervision philosophy with information disclosure at its core. It states that to 
facilitate investors’ decision-making, the content and format of information disclosure must be improved, 
and that disclosure should be more targeted. Disclosures that are of great influence for investors’ 
decision-making (such as the key business of issuers, business model, external market environment, 
operational performance, and major risk factors) are emphasized. It also urges issuers to use plain 
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language in order to enhance the readability of disclosed information and facilitate supervision by 
medium- and small-scale investors. 
The Opinions has also specified independent entity responsibilities during issuance shouldered by 
institutions and personnel providing securities services, such as issuers, sponsors, accounting firms, law 
firms, certified public values, and so on. Issuance supervision departments and the Public Offering 
Review Committee under the CSRC are in charge of examining and reviewing the legality and 
compliance of application papers for public offerings and disclosed information. (No judgment of the 
issuers’ profitability or investment value will be made.) As the first parties responsible for information 
disclosure, issuers must provide intermediaries with authentic, complete and accurate materials. Sponsors, 
in turn, must make professional judgments about whether issuers are capable of sustaining profitability 
and whether issuers meet legal conditions of issuance. Sponsors must also make sure that disclosure 
materials presented by issuers – such as application documents and the prospectus – are true, accurate, 
complete and timely. Intermediaries, like accounting firms, law firms and asset evaluation agencies, must 
likewise guarantee the veracity of relevant professional documents. 
Meanwhile, the Opinions has also set stricter quality requirements for the prospectus. After the 
prospectus is published, relevant information about issuers or financial data cannot be altered. Once 
disparities between application materials are identified, the CSRC will suspend review and 
recommendations for share placement made by involved sponsors will not be accepted for 12 months. If 
cases are investigated and placed on file due to false records, misleading statements or major omissions, 
acceptance of applications recommended by involved intermediaries will also be suspended. If the above-
mentioned illegalities are proven true, applications for share offerings made by the same issuer will not be 
accepted for 36 months after the date of verification. In short, involved intermediaries and parties must be 
held accountable. 
The Opinions has tightened requirements on the commitments made by involved responsible 
entities. It requires issuers to make commitments and puts forward measures in case of failure to honor 
commitments. All this is subject to disclosure and public supervision. The Opinions requires enhanced 
transparency regarding major shareholders’ holding intentions. The restricted stock trade period for major 
shareholders is pegged to post-listing performance, and issuers must ascertain and publish plans to 
stabilize share prices if and when share prices fall lower than net asset per share in the three years 
following a listing. 
The Opinions has further tightened regulations on relevant responsibility entities. If losses are 
imposed upon investors due to illegalities during information disclosure, responsible parties such as 
issuers and their holding shareholders, or involved intermediaries, must compensate for said losses 
according to relevant laws. If share issuance runs against conditions for listing, issuers must buy back the 
newly-issued shares, and controlling shareholders must buy the transferred share stock. Further, the 
credibility record and practice of intermediaries are published in line with regulations in the Opinions so 
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as to regulate their practice. Once clues of illegalities or violations are spotted on the part of issuers, 
majority shareholders or intermediaries, measures including listing suspension, listing review, case filing 
and investigation and transfer to judicial authorities must be taken. Thus accountability is strengthened, 
punishments become harsher, and openness, fairness and equality in the market are supported. 
Regulations in the Opinions have overall underpinned a market-based regulatory mechanism, 
strengthened accountability and laid a solid foundation for the IPO registration system. 
2.1.4.2 More market-based new share pricing 
The Opinions has expanded the term of validity of IPO approval documents from six to twelve months, 
allowing issuers and leading underwriters to choose IPO timing with more flexibility based on the market 
situation. Going forward, the pace of IPOs will be determined by market demand. The reformed pricing 
approach also facilitates a more market-based way of setting issue prices by issuers and leading 
underwriters. After review and approval, the time and method of issuance are determined by issuers, and 
issue prices more accurately reflect supply–demand dynamics. The Opinions also puts more effective 
reins on overpricing by offline investors. When setting the issue price, at least 10 per cent of the 
subscriptions with the highest subscription prices must be excluded, eliminating their influence on 
pricing. Investors that made these subscriptions are forbidden to participate in offline placement, putting 
an end to subjective quotes and blind over-quotations. Such regulations give full play to the market in 
rationalizing pricing, curbing overpricing and blind speculation of new shares, and safeguards the 
legitimate rights and interests of investors. 
The Opinions has also required individual investors to play their role in determining the issue 
price. Issuers and leading underwriters must allow eligible individual investors to take part in offline 
pricing and offline placement. Securities firms with underwriting qualifications must set requirements for 
individual investors hereby mentioned beforehand and inform the public. 
The Opinions has emphasized requirements for information disclosure. Issuers and leading 
underwriters must formulate information disclosure documents about the pricing process and results; 
these they must release to the public. Prior to online subscription, issuers and leading underwriters must 
disclose detailed quotations of all offline investors, including the names of investors, their subscription 
prices and correspondent subscription volume, median and weighted average of quotations made by all 
offline investors, median and weighted average of quotations made by securities investment funds set up 
through public placement, the final issue price and corresponding P/E ratio, and so on. 
2.1.4.3 Reform of the IPO system 
The Opinions has introduced an independent leading-underwriter-placement system. Shares issued offline 
are placed by leading underwriters to a selected group of investors that have made valid quotations. 
Issuers must consult with leading underwriters to determine the principles and methods of offline 
placement. These they must disclose in the issue notice. Underwriters must make placement in line with 
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principles announced beforehand. Placement of new shares respects subscription intentions of medium- 
and small-scale investors. Also the carry-back mechanism and online placement mechanism have been 
adjusted accordingly. Carry-back proportions from offline to online placement are set for different 
brackets of valid subscription multipliers. The introduction of an independent placement system calls for 
securities firms to consider developing and fostering customers with long-term collaborations and to be 
responsible for customers’ investment returns. To this end, securities firms must make reasonable pricing 
so as to balance the interests of issuers and customers. In this way, overpricing – which only serves the 
interests of issuers – can be avoided. At the same time, stronger focus on information disclosure 
throughout the IPO process intensifies public supervision, prevents backroom deals and guarantees 
equality, fairness and openness during independent placement by securities firms. 
The Opinions has reformed online placement approaches. Only investors that hold a certain 
amount of restricted shares are eligible for online subscription. Such reform serves to encourage investors 
in secondary markets to hold shares for a longer time, develop a value investing philosophy, prevent 
speculation in new shares, and mitigate shocks to secondary markets brought about by subscriptions for 
new share placement. Further, the Opinions has stipulated that online subscription volumes for each 
investor must be no more than one thousandth of the number of the initial share issuance. In this way, 
institutional investors and shareholders of listed companies are unable to make massive subscriptions for 
new shares with their capital and shareholding advantages. 
According to the Opinions, when issuers make IPOs, shareholders that have held shares of the 
issuer for more than three years are encouraged to transfer part of their shares to investors so that the 
proportion of tradable shares of the newly-listed companies will be raised. The transfer of old shares is of 
great significance. First of all, the issue volume of new shares is determined by capital demand, so 
transfer of old shares is most welcome for issuers whose new share volume falls short of the requirements 
for listing. Secondly, the transfer of old shares to investors during the IPO helps to increase the proportion 
of tradable shares. It moderates the overpricing of investors and facilitates reasonable pricing of new 
shares. Third, clauses in the Opinions have stated that excesses in fund-raising can be offset by reduction 
in old-share holdings. Lastly, moderate transfer of old shares serves to mitigate shocks in secondary 
markets caused by the sudden lift of limits on non-tradable shares. 
2.2 Empirical study: Influence of market-oriented evolution of IPO system on pricing efficiency 
The key to IPO pricing lies in how to resolve asymmetric information dynamics between listed companies 
and investors. Under the former approval system, the CSRC was in charge of allocating listing 
opportunities and reviewing the quality of companies. So investors made investment decisions based on 
their faith in regulators. As the IPO system moves towards a more market-oriented one, underwriters 
assume increasingly important roles. Investment banks gain more freedom during pricing and shoulder 
more responsibilities for evaluating the credibility and risks of issuers and recommending qualified 
companies to the CSRC. So investors’ pricing of the IPO is also influenced by the credibility of 
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underwriters. This chapter analyzes the influence of the market-oriented evolution of the IPO system on 
pricing efficiency by examining the influence of underwriters’ credibility on IPO premiums and IPO 
long-term performance. 
2.2.1 Theoretical analyses 
Research shows that during the process of an IPO, underwriters are capable of discerning the profitability 
of issuers, mitigating information asymmetry between issuers and potential investors, and thereby 
optimizing resource allocation (Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990). According to the 
Certifying Agent Theory put forward by Booth and Smith (1986), issuers can send good signals about 
quality to investors through hiring underwriters with high credibility, because underwriters with high 
credibility will evaluate issuer quality prudently before deciding whether or not to undertake an IPO for 
them. Naturally, to avoid damaging their own prestige, underwriters with high credibility are more prone 
to declining underwriting IPOs of low-quality companies. In this way, low-quality issuers have to find 
underwriters with poor reputations. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) further developed the Certifying 
Agent Theory. They maintained that IPO underpricing is a decreasing function of underwriter reputation. 
That is, the greater underwriter reputation, the less asymmetric the IPO information will be. So 
information conformity between the issue price and the issuer’s actual quality can be judged from 
underwriter reputation. 
There has been extensive research into the measurement of underwriter reputation. Carter and 
Manaster (1990) compared the relative placements of investment banks in tombstone announcements. A 
discrete scale (0–9) was used as a proxy variable of underwriter reputation: ‘9’ stood for the best 
reputation and ‘0’ stood for the poorest reputation. Johnson and Miller (1988) revised this reputation 
scale. They classified reputation into four levels (0–3): ‘0’ represented the highest level and’3’the lowest 
level. Megginson and Weiss (1991), in contrast, adopted market share as a proxy for underwriter 
reputation. 
Carter and Manaster (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Carter et al. (1998) sampled IPOs 
of various kinds in the 1980s and proved a negative correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO 
underpricing. According to their research, low underpricing rates can be ascribed to high underwriter 
reputation. Beatty and Welch (1996), Cooney et al. (2001), and Loughran and Ritter (2004), however, 
found that such a correlation reversed in the 1990s.  Loughran and Ritter (2004) argued that the reverse 
occurred because, during the dot-com bubble, high-reputation underwriters slackened their 
recommendation standards for listing and started to underwrite hi-tech companies with shorter histories 
and less certain market prospects. But such an uncertain correlation between underwriter reputation and 
IPO underpricing was also detected in Japan (Beckman et al., 2001; Kirkulak and David, 2005), Australia 
(Dimovski and Brooks, 2004; Dimovski et al., 2011) and other countries. 
Research shows that not only can underwriter reputation redress information asymmetry in the 
primary market, but it also helps to boost market confidence in corporate shares. Renowned investment 
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banks enjoy excellent broker networks and unique research capabilities. They can recommend influential 
shares to the secondary market (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001) and fuel the long-term performance of 
IPOs in the secondary market trading (Carter et al., 1998; Bharat and Kini, 1999). Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) studied 947 IPOs between 1984 and 1988 and found that the more prestigious the underwriter, the 
more probable it was that the long-term share performance outweighed that of the overall market. Later 
research on 2,292 IPOs between 1979 and 1991 by Carter et al. (1998) reached similar conclusions. 
Though underwriter reputation has a pronounced impact on IPO underpricing and long-term 
performance in developed countries, further research on this relationship is needed for emerging markets. 
Compared with developed markets, emerging markets feature lower information efficiency and more 
severe information asymmetry (Harvey, 1995; Chan et al., 2008). So it takes longer for information to be 
fully reflected by asset prices, which may weaken the signaling role of underwriters in emerging markets. 
Some research has overlooked the influence of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-term 
performance, because there is no credible ranking system of underwriter reputation in emerging markets, 
and because the popular tombstone announcement approach designed by Carter and Manaster (1990) is 
not applicable outside the United States. 
Recently, two studies have introduced a proxy variable for underwriter reputation in China, using 
regression models to examine the correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. 
Gannon and Zhou (2008) took the top ten underwriters with the largest market shares in 2003 as highly 
prestigious underwriters. According to their study, IPO samples in 2003 showed no conspicuous positive 
correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. Guo and Brooks (2008) classified 
underwriters into three grades according to their average market shares. They sampled 286 IPOs between 
March 2001 and 2005 and found that IPOs underwritten by underwriters of higher reputation in the 
previous 30 trading days registered lower short-term underpricing rates. However their t-statistic result 
was not statistically significant. 
As the world’s largest and most important emerging market, China’s stock market features some 
unique characteristics. For example, China’s stock market has a short history, and institutional norms and 
trading rules are also different from those in developed markets. In China’s stock market, individual 
investors are the mainstay, while common funds are still at an infant stage. By the end of 2008, there were 
respectively 133.95 million individual investors and 570,000 institutional investors. Shareholding 
structures of Chinese listed companies are also unique: The majority of state shares and legal person 
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shares are unlisted and stay out of circulation.1 Problems like bureaucracy and low efficiency are also 
widely noted and criticized (Chan et al., 2004).2 
China’s IPO system has departed from administrative control towards market-orientation. As 
important intermediaries for IPO issuance, underwriters are assuming increasingly crucial roles, and their 
practices are gaining more attention from the market. Quota management was introduced for new share 
issuance in 2001. Under this system, total share issuance quotas across the country were set jointly by the 
CSRC and the State Planning Commission. Then the quotas were distributed to local governments and 
central departments. The CSRC, rather than investment banks, was in charge of examining and 
supervising IPO issuers’ credibility, business risks and financing scales; the time volumes were also 
decided by the CSRC. To increase their shares of a quota as much as possible and shy away from the 
impacts caused by failed IPO issuance, local governments usually assisted issuers in manipulating profits 
with fiscal subsidies or chose investment banks that were willing to act as underwriters and cover up their 
deceptive behaviors (Chan et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2008). In April 2001, quota management was 
replaced by a more market-based approach – the Approval System. The central government no longer 
imposed limits on annual issuance quotas or the amount of IPOs. Investment banks gained more initiative 
in pricing and were granted more responsibilities for evaluating issuers’ credibility and risks and 
recommending qualified companies to the CSRC. Apparently, as the IPO system grows more market-
oriented, underwriters shoulder more responsibilities and the market has higher requirements for them. 
Underwriters have to honor their reputations more earnestly. In particular, since the inception of the 
Sponsor System, IPO issuers’ internal quality has had direct bearings upon the long-term reputation 
within the profession – and even their survival. Proceeding from their own interests, underwriters pay 
attention to internal quality of IPO companies as well as issuance fees when selecting IPO candidates. As 
                                                 
1 Common shares of listed companies are comprised of tradable shares and non-tradable shares. Tradable 
shares include A-shares, B-shares, H-shares and N-shares on the SSE and SZSE. A-shares are RMB-
denominated and issued to Chinese residents; B-shares, denominated in US dollars on the SSE and by 
HK dollars on SZSE, are issued particularly to foreign investors. Non-tradable shares include: (1) State 
shares held by the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC); (2) State-owned legal person shares held by other state-owned enterprises; (3) Legal person 
shares held by enterprises and public institutions; and (4) Staff shares held by employees (such shares 
have restricted stock trade period before they become tradable A-shares). By the end of 2008, China’s 
stock market registered a total market cap of CNY12.13664 trillion (CNY9.72519 trillion on the SSE 
and CNY2.41145 trillion on the SZSE). Market cap of tradable shares stood at only CNY4.52139 trillion 
(CNY3.23059 trillion for the SSE and CNY1.2908 billion for the SZSE). 
2 Please refer to Sun and Tong (2003) and Wang et al. (2008) for information about the characteristics of 
China’s IPO system.  
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a result, IPO candidates prefer underwriters of high prestige as their agents, and renowned underwriters 
seek IPO companies with good internal quality. 
To study the correlation between the underpricing of IPOs, IPO long-term performance, and 
underwriter reputation, this book takes 1,351 companies listed between 1992 and 2007. In previous 
studies (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Kirkulak and David, 2005; Dimovski et al., 2011), it was 
hypothesized that underwriter reputation remained fixed throughout the analysis. However in this study, 
the relative market share of each underwriter and the total number of underwritten IPO companies are 
used as proxy variables for underwriter reputation. All samples are divided into five periods with three 
years over the entire sample period. Mergers and reorganizations of securities firms are also taken into 
account. To conduct a comparative study, all samples are divided into two groups: A quota system group 
(hereafter referred to as the old system group), comprised of IPOs between 1992 and 2000, and an 
Approval System group (hereafter referred to as the new-system group), comprised of IPOs between 2001 
and 2007. This study compares the signaling role of underwriters in underpricing prior to and after the 
reform of the IPO issuance system, so as to verify the efficacy of the market-oriented IPO reform in 
reducing administrative intervention. 
2.2.2 Data description and methodology 
2.2.2.1 Sampling and data source 
Research in this study includes all IPO companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between January 1992 and December 2007. Except for those not 
underwritten by investment banks, there are in total 1,351 sampled IPOs, taking up 85.24 per cent of all 
A-shares in the sampled period. Among these, 775 were listed on the SSE and 576 on the SZSE. Data 
mentioned in this book, such as the issue price, issue volume, amount of tradable shares, total equity, and 
the interval between listing and issuance and additional issue, are collected by the CSMAR database. The 
accuracy of this data has been verified with prospectuses of listed companies and official sites of the SSE 
(http://www.sse.com.cn) and the SZSE (http://www.szse.cn). Other data, such as closing prices of the first 
day of listing, daily return rates, and A-share indexes for both exchanges, are collected from DataStream. 
When calculating the daily return rate, factors like stock splits, stock dividends and preferred shares are 
taken into account. 
2.2.2.2 Measurement of underpricing rate 
Initial return (IR) adjusted by market index is the ratio between the closing price on the first day of listing 
and the issue price of new shares (minus the ratio between the closing index on the first day of listing on 
either the SSE or SZSE and A-share closing index on the day of listing on the SSE or SZSE). The 
formula is as follows: 
,1 ,0 ,1 ,0( / ) ( / )i i i i iIR p P I I   2.1 
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In the formula, iIR is the initial return adjusted by the market index; ,1ip is the closing price on the first 
day of listing; ,0iP is the issue price of new shares; ,1iI is the closing index on the first day of listing; ,0iI is 
the closing index on the day of listing. 
 
Table 2.1: Temporal distribution of China’s IPOs and distribution of issuance volume 
 Full Sample  Shanghai Stock Exchange  
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
  N IR 
Issuance 
Scale 
 N IR 
Issuance 
Scale 
 N IR 
Issuance 
Scale 
Panel A: Year 
1992 25 2,039.33 3,583.09  20 2484.53 1,912.13  5 258.55 1,670.96 
1993 83 266.33 21,015.44  50 330.46 10,457.05  33 169.17 10,558.39 
1994 82 133.14 17,366.73  57 142.21 13,376.51  25 112.48 3,990.22 
1995 11 93.34 2,532.50  8 90.85 2,149.14  3 99.97 383.35 
1996 160 128.73 23,891.50  83 111.39 12,776.84  77 147.42 11,114.66 
1997 172 154.87 60,518.86  72 152.69 22,854.93  100 156.44 37,663.93 
1998 89 129.89 39,856.30  47 138.72 22,775.71  42 120.02 17,080.59 
1999 82 120.77 46,185.58  37 112.17 21,906.76  45 127.84 24,278.82 
2000 128 146.12 85,672.25  86 148.18 60,899.74  42 141.90 24,772.51 
2001 77 149.55 64,449.54  77 149.55 64,449.54  0 -- -- 
2002 69 133.00 53,365.44  69 133.00 53,365.44  0 -- -- 
2003 67 72.25 49,970.78  67 72.25 49,970.78  0 -- -- 
2004 100 72.20 38,517.63  61 72.78 24,930.12  39 71.29 13,587.52 
2005 15 48.95 5,763.07  3 76.32 2,854.54  12 42.10 2,908.53 
2006 65 81.94 126,242.46  13 34.33 110,328.34  52 93.84 15,914.12 
2007 126 189.05 460,517.72  25 125.16 420,068.42  101 204.87 40,449.30 
1992–2000 832 207.25 300,622.25  460 258.04 169,108.82  372 144.45 131,513.43 
2001–2007 519 120.68 798,826.63  315 107.23 725,967.16  204 141.46 72,859.47 
Panel B: Issuance Volume 
Small 270 364.27 27,064.76  155 476.64 14,623.76  115 215.14 12,444.93 
2  270 155.65 51,881.82  155 184.77 32,073.55  115 141.09 20,666.21 
3 271 144.00 77,103.05  155 140.51 48,907.53  116 123.35 29,116.34 
4 270 122.26 113,977.73  155 109.93 71,584.64  115 130.51 41,989.18 
Big 270 83.91 829,421.52  155 71.86 727,886.51  115 107.03 100,156.23 
Full sample 1,351 174.00 1,099,448.88  775 196.74 895,075.98  576 143.39 204,372.90 
 
Panel A in Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistical analysis of the number of IPOs between 1992 and 
2007 and their IR adjusted by the market index and issuance volume. The issuance volume has been 
adjusted based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 2005. The CPI between 1992 and 2007 is gained 
through collecting relative data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Among all the samples, 1995 saw 
the smallest number of 11 IPOs, and in 1997 the number increased several-fold to 172 IPOs. In 2000, the 
CSRC planned to set up the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
on the SZSE. As a result, issuance of new shares was suspended on the SZSE for three consecutive years 
from 2001 and 2003. As can be seen in Panel A in Table 2.1, the average adjusted IR of 1,351 IPOs 
stands at 174.00 per cent, corroborating the conclusions of most studies that China’s primary market has 
been under-estimated by a large margin. From 2001 to 2007, a new IPO system was put in place. Average 
adjusted IR for 519 IPO-listed companies stood at 120.68 per cent – significantly lower than the 
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207.25 per cent average adjusted IR of 832 IPOs under the old system. This contrast is significant under 
1 per cent (t-stat = 3.34; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 13.31). The results imply that the new IPO issuance system 
is conducive to reducing IPO underpricing. 
To test influence of issuance volume on IPO underpricing, 1,351 IPOs in the sample are divided 
into five groups according to issuance volume adjusted for CPI. Panel B in Table 2.1 shows that there is 
an obvious negative correlation between IR and issuance volume. Specifically, the small-volume group 
(IPOs whose volumes are below CNY152.8 million) registers an average IR of 364.27 per cent, while the 
large-volume group (IPOs whose volumes are over CNY537.7 million) registers an average IR of merely 
83.91 per cent. Average issuance volume for IPOs on the SSE is CNY1.15494 billion. Under the 
significance level of 1 per cent, this figure is dramatically higher than that of the SZSE’s 
CNY354.81 million (t-stat = 3.01; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 9.02). 
2.2.2.3 Measurement of long-term performance of IPOs 
Measurement of the long-term performance of IPOs has long been controversial. This book adopts the 
conventionally used Event Time and Calendar Time approaches. Ritter (1991) applied the CAR approach 
in monthly asset portfolio rebalancing to measure the long-term performance of IPOs, but Conrad and 
Kaul (1993) and Barber and Lyon (1997) have argued that CAR may cause a downward deviation 
because dependent months are used. This, they reason, fails to accurately reflect long-term returns to 
investors. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) noted that BHAR is a better approach to 
measure long-term abnormal returns, because the holding strategies represented by BHAR better mirror 
investors’ actual behaviors. Furthermore, BHAR can sidestep problems introduced by frequent 
transactions and reduce statistical bias that occurs in CAR. Despite this, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and 
Brav et al. (2000) prefer CAR. They maintained that BHAR is more sensitive to cross-section dependency 
among samples, thus amplifying long-term abnormal returns. 
Fama (1998) summarized documents and literature on the computing methods of abnormal 
returns. He remarked that abnormal returns may be caused by measurement methods, and in the long run, 
abnormal returns tend to disappear due to changes in computing methods. According to Gompers and 
Lerner (2003), the three-factor model put forward by Fama and French (1993) holds special significance 
for the measurement of long-term returns in that it serves to control clusters of events and potential cross-
section correlations. Gompers and Lerner (2003) studied 3,661 IPOs between 1935 and 1972, finding that 
long-term underperformance calculated by BHAR lasted for more than five years, but no long-term 
abnormal returns were spotted using CAR analysis. The result was consistent with the pseudo-market 
timing theory: Long-term underperformance forecasted by Event Time did not occur in the Calendar 
Time scenario (Schultz, 2003). Loughran and Ritter (2004) held that it was difficult for Calendar Time to 




As no consensus has been reached on the optimal calculation method for long-term abnormal 
returns (Lyon et al., 1999), this study measures long-term abnormal returns by Event Time and Calendar 
Time: 1) Under the Event Time scenario, the selection of paired companies include industry, size and 
book-to-market ratio; 2) The intercept in Calendar Time comes from a multi-factor model. 
(1)Event time approach 
On average, China’s stock market trades for 242 days each year, 20 days a month. Twenty consecutive 
trading days, starting from the first trading day, are defined as an event month. The IR period is defined 
as the first day of listing; the period from the second day to the 21st is the first month; the 22nd to 41st the 
second month, and so on. An IPO’s long-term performance (IR excluded) is assessed by calculating 
adjusted BHARs and CARs of paired companies in the 36 consecutive months after listing. 
Modern capital asset pricing theory deems it very important to choose a suitable benchmark 
(Ritter, 1991; Fama and French, 1996; Lyon et al., 1999), though Barber and Lyon (1997) thought paired 
companies are the most suitable benchmarks for measuring long-term returns, as they can accommodate 
particular statistical tests. As Perry and William (1994) noted, similar economic and competitive factors 
would generate comparability among companies in operation, investment and financing, so companies 
can be classified in terms of industry, size and book-to-market ratio. If no paired companies meet these 
three standards at the same time, only standards for industry and book-to-market ratio have to be reached. 
This book pairs each IPO company with one non-IPO company listed for more than three years 
on the SSE. Pairing abides by the following principle: The sample company and the pair company belong 
to the same industry with similar book-to-market ratios. Specifically speaking, the market cap of the pair 
company must be no less than 80 per cent and no more than 120 per cent of that of the sample company. 
Market cap is calculated by multiplying the total amount of tradable shares by the closing price on the 
first day of listing. The book-to-market ratio of the paired company is the result of dividing its book value 
by its market cap from the previous year. The wave range of the book-to-market ratio stands between 
90 per cent and 110 per cent (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). If there are not enough 
candidate companies within a certain industry, pair companies can be selected from similar industries 
based on size and book-to-market ratio. Among 1,531 samples included in this book, 1,201 are paired in 
terms of industry, size and book-to-market ratio, 141 are paired based on industry and book-to-market 
ratio, and the remaining 189 are paired in similar industries based on size and book-to-market ratio (the 
industry distribution of all samples can be found in Appendix I). 
First, according to the equation put forward by Loughran and Ritter (1995), the ,i TBHAR adjusted 
for a paired company after T periods is: 
, , , 1 , 1 ,
[ (1 ) 1] [ (1 ) 1]T T
i T i t m t t i t t m t
BHAR BHR BHR R R            2.2 
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In the equation, BHRi,t stands for rate of return for buying and holding No. i IPO, ,m tBHR stands for the 
rate of return for buying and holding shares of No. i paired company, ,i tR stands for the monthly rate of 
return of No. i IPO in month t, and ,m tR stands for the monthly rate of return of No.i pair company in 
month t. 
For N IPOs, equally weighted 
T
BHAR adjusted for paired companies after T periods can be 






   2.3 
Lyon et al. (1999) used t-statistics adjusted for skewness to test the significance level of
T
BHAR : 
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, and ˆ represents the estimate 
of the coefficient of skewness. 
For N IPOs, the rate of abnormal return during holding period adjusted for a paired company and 
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The accumulative value, 
T






  2.6 
The t-statistics for 
T
CAR adopt the method put forward by Ritter (1991): 
( ) /
T T t
t CAR CAR N csd  2.7 
In this formula, 
1/2[ var 2 ( 1) cov]
t
csd t t      , where var stands for the average cross-sectional 
variance of ,i tAR in the holding period of 36 months and cov stands for first order autocovariance of the 
series. 
 (2) Calendar Time approach 
To eliminate cross-sectional interdependence among samples under the Event Time scenario and render 
more robust research results, two Calendar Time methods are used to measure the long-term abnormal 
return of IPOs. First of all, the average monthly rate of abnormal returns to IPO investment portfolios 
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listed within 36 months is calculated between January 1994 and December 2008. Secondly, two multi-
factor models are regressed to test the significance of time sequence on long-term returns. The three-
factor model designed by Fama and French (1993) is: 
, , , , ,
( )
p t f t i i m t f t i t i t i t
R R R R s SMB h HML          2.8 
where ,p tR is the portfolio return of the IPO in month t, ,f tR stands for the risk-free interest rate,3 which 
can be observed at the beginning of month t, ,m tR represents the market return rate weighted by market 
cap in month t, 
t
SMB represents the zero portfolio return rate – the rate of return of small-cap shares 
minus the rate of return of large-cap shares, 
t
HML is the zero portfolio return rate (high-BM stock return 
minus low-BM stock return) and ,i t stands for the residual. 
Carhart (1997) further developed the three-factor model, adding a momentum factor to reflect the 
momentum effect proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The subsequent four-factor model is as 
follows: 
, , , , ,
( )
p t f t i i m t f t i t i t i t i t
R R R R s SMB h HML mWML           2.9 
Here, 
t
WML is the momentum factor, representing the zero-investment-portfolio rate of return: The 
winner-portfolio rate of return minus the loser-portfolio rate of return. Other variants are the same as in 
equation 2.8. 
The intercept of the multi-factor regression can be used to test whether the average monthly rate 
of abnormal return for IPO investment portfolio is zero. With market, size, value and momentum factors 
under control, the intercept is notably positive or negative, signaling excellent or poor long-term 
performance of IPO returns. 
 (3) Cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
Cross-section OLS regression confirms that underwriters serve to certify IR and long-term return of IPOs. 
To reduce the potential influence of the abnormal distribution of BHAR for three years on long-term 
underperformance in IPOs, research in this study uses the natural logarithm of the sum of equally 
weighted BHAR, adjusted for paired companies in the following three years, and 1,000 per cent. The 
dependent variables of IR (adjusted for market index) and LnBHAR are regressed against the reputation 
variables REP1 and REP2. REP1 assumes that the larger the market share managed by an underwriter, the 
higher its reputation is. REP2, however, assumes that the more IPOs an underwriter undertakes, the more 
                                                 
3 In this book, the rate of return on 3-month residents’ deposits is set as the risk-free interest rate. The 
frequently-used 3-month Treasury bond rate was rolled out in 2001, and it does not apply in this research 
(Wang, 2004; Chang et al., 2010). 
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familiar investors are with it and the more prestigious the underwriter is (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; 
Dimovski, et al., 2011). In previous studies, underwriter reputation was assumed to be the same during 
the full sampled period, but this study takes into account changes in underwriter reputation caused by 
mergers of securities firms. There are altogether five periods: 1992–4, 1995–7, 1998–2000, 2001–3 and 
2004–7. In each period, REP1 (the proportion of underwritten volume in total issuance volume) and 
REP2 (the amount of IPOs undertaken by each underwriter) are calculated. If the IPO of the same 
company is underwritten by two or more underwriters, the underwritten volume is evenly distributed 
among the underwriters. 
To evaluate the marginal effects of the reputation variables, seven additional variables are added 
into the regression model (as applied in previous research) in order to control for IPOs risks. Table 2.2 
describes definitions of all control variables in the cross-section OLS regression model. The regression 
model is: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑛𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = α + β1[𝑅𝐸𝑃1 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑃2] + β2𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + β3𝑆𝐸𝑂 + β4𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + β5𝑆𝐷 + β6𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇
+ β7𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + β8𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐴𝐺 + ε,                                                                                                2.10 




LNSIZE LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total issuance size. Issuance size is the accumulated 
capital for IPO issuance with one million yuan as the unit of measurement. LNSIZE serves to 
control the systemic influences of IPO issuance under par. Compared with big companies, 
small companies disclose less information and hold more risks and uncertainties (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986). 
SEO SEO stands for proxy variables. If an IPO company issues additional shares within three 
years, then its value is 1; otherwise it is 0. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) held 
that IPO underpricing can be regarded as a signal sent by companies to investors, and that 
investors can receive compensation from additional issuance.  
FLOAT FLOAT is the proportion of tradable shares in total shares issued. Most state shares and some 
legal person shares cannot enter circulation, so there arise agency costs and low liquidity. In 
fact, IPO underpricing is constant compensation for growing risks (Chen et al., 2004). 
SD SD is the standard deviation of returns for IPO companies. It shows potential cash flow risks 
for companies (Johnson and Miller, 1988). It is calculated via the rate of return for IPO 
companies’ time sequence during the time sequence [1,244]; 244 is selected because the 
average trading days of China’s stock market between 1992 and 2007 are 244 days.  
MARKET MARKET stands for the A-share weighted average return of the SSE and SZSE in the three 
months before listing. The weight is determined by time: Weight stands at three for the nearest 
month, two for two months, and one for three months. Companies can issue an IPO on 
occasions of good market performance. (Derrien and Womack, 2003). 
TECH TECH stands for proxy variables. If an IPO company is a hi-tech company, its TECH value is 
1, otherwise it is 0. The industry breakdown follows standards released by the CSRC in 2006. 
Compared with traditional industries, hi-tech companies bear higher risks but may harvest 
greater developments in the future (Ritter, 1991). 
LNLAG LNLAG stands for the natural logarithm of the interval between IPO issuance and listing. 




Panels A and B in Table 2.3 provide descriptive statistics for the variables and the Pearson correlation 
coefficients. For example, IPO companies of larger size and higher maturity are generally underwritten by 
securities firms with higher reputations. These companies normally register low stand deviations in IR 
and lower risks, but the proportion of tradable shares is also lower. 
2.2.3 Case study and analyses of IPO underpricing 
2.2.3.1 Analysis of IPO underpricing under two reputation variables 
All IPOs are divided into high- and poor-reputation groups, based on the median of REP1 in each period. 
As can be seen in Panel A in Table 2.4, in the old system period (1992 to 2000), the IR of the high-
reputation group was 247.11 per cent. This was far higher than that of the poor-reputation group 
(170.35 per cent). Parametric and non-parametric tests verify the significance of these results at the level 
of 5 per cent (t-stat = 2.49) and 1 per cent (Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 7.97). However, under the new system 
(from 2001 to 2007), the average IR of the poor-reputation group at the 5 per cent level was far higher 
than that of the high-reputation group (t-stat = 2.28; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 5.94). Panel B in Table 2.4 
shows grouping results based on the median of REP2 in various periods. 
 
Table2.3: Descriptive statistics of variables and Pearson correlation coefficients 
 REP1 SIZE SEO FLOAT SD MARKET TECH LAG 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Quota Management Period: 1992–2000 
Mean 6.70 361.32  0.53 24.43 3.90 7.38 0.06 87.74  
Median 5.87 245.79  0.00 25.00 3.62 3.54 0.00 30.00  
Max 18.47  8,369.81  2.00 65.42 31.21 155.19 1.00 3,373.00  
Min 0.07 22.18  0.00 0.88 1.11 –53.10 0.00 0.00 
St. Dev. 5.32 486.07  0.55 9.33 2.16 20.72 0.23 233.94  
Approval System Period: 2001–2007 
Mean 3.46  1,539.16  0.35 27.31 3.10 3.48 0.07 23.91  
Median 1.22 327.87  0.00 27.27 2.93 0.50 0.00 15.00  
Max 27.77 62,846.93  2.00 57.77 6.12 53.50 1.00 3,385.00  
Min 0.02 89.15  0.00 1.36 1.28 –17.60 0.00 0.00 
St. Dev. 5.62  5,864.76  0.51 9.33 1.04 14.06 0.25 148.18  
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 REP1 LNSIZE SEO FLOAT SD MARKET TECH LNLAG 
 
The upper triangular matrix holds correlation coefficients of explanatory variables for 832 sampled 
IPO companies during the Quota Management period (1992-2000) 
REP1 1 –0.176 0.031 –0.173 0.075 0.106 0.026 0.029 
REP2 0.730 –0.109 0.045 –0.246 0.068 0.156 0.001 0.039 
LNSIZE –0.147 1 –0.022 0.066 –0.125 –0.106 –0.081 –0.118 
SEO 0.055 –0.026 1 0.079 –0.188 –0.096 0.007 0.014 
FLOAT –0.156 –0.042 0.155 1 –0.390 –0.021 –0.050 0.226 
SD 0.046 –0.113 –0.239 –0.157 1 0.127 0.002 –0.155 
MARKET 0.064 –0.090 –0.165 –0.034 0.118 1 –0.022 –0.204 
TECH 0.020 –0.037 0.047 –0.047 0.065 0.010 1 –0.029 
LNLAG –0.043 –0.209 0.094 –0.085 0.174 –0.105 –0.011 1 
 
The lower triangular matrix holds correlation coefficients of explanatory variables for 519 sampled 




Table 2.4:Underwriter reputation and IR adjusted for market index of IPO companies 
Reputation Variables 
Quota Management period: 1992–2000  Approval System period: 2001–2007 
N Mean Median St. Dev.  N Mean Median St. Dev. 
Panel A: REP1 
Low 432 170.35 121.39 306.67  262 130.33 92.82 100.93 
High 400 247.11 129.04 540.37  257 110.85 90.81 94.21 
t-stat  (2.49)**     (2.28)**   
χ2  (7.97)***     (5.94)**   
Panel B: REP2 
Low 450 169.83 123.53 301.09  268 131.74 92.35 101.40 
High 382 251.34 128.11 552.21  251 112.96 91.70 93.51 
t-stat  (2.57)***     (2.26)**   
χ2  (8.01)***     (6.14)**   
Full sample 832 207.25 125.12 436.68  519 120.68 92.03 97.67 
 
2.2.3.2 Analysis of results of cross-section OLS regression 
According to Table 2.4, from 1992 to 2000 (the old system period), underwriter reputation had a positive 
influence on IPO underpricing, while in the new-system period, it negatively influenced IPO 
underpricing. Here these conclusions are tested through a cross-section OLS regression based on 1,351 
IPOs on the SSE and SZSE. 
In Panel A in Table 2.5, regression models (1) and (2) describe correlations between IPO 
underpricing, REP1 and REP2 (respectively), and other control variables under the old system scenario. 
Regression models (3) and (4) describe correlations between IPO underpricing, REP1 and REP2 
(respectively) and other control variables under the new-system scenario. The OLS regression analysis 
results are consistent with those in Table 2.4, verifying the positive influence and negative influence of 
underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing in the old- and new-system periods, respectively. Such 
correlations between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing enriches existing research conclusions 
about emerging markets, and holds great significance for China’s reform of the IPO issuance system. The 
Approval System helps to correct information asymmetry in the new share issuance market, but it can 







Table 2.5:Analysis of the results of influence of underwriter reputation on IR of IPO companies  
 Intercept REP1 REP2 LNSIZE SEO FLOAT STD MARKET TECH LNLAG Adj. R2 
Panel A:full sample 
Quota Management period: 1992–2000 
(1) 1.7065 0.5618  –0.9382 0.1703 –0.6508 0.4372 0.8452 0.7983 0.6284 0.179 
  (2.01)**  (–4.98)*** (0.65) (–4.27)*** (5.97)*** (3.43)*** (1.35) (2.50)**  
(2) 1.7053  0.5406 –0.9302 0.1602 –0.6541 0.4374 0.8262 0.8256 0.6370 0.179 
   (2.21)** (–4.34)*** (0.48) (–3.17)*** (4.28)*** (3.59)*** (1.19) (2.59)***  
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
(3) 1.0424 –0.1705  –0.2346 0.0054 –0.8570 0.2761 1.7187 0.4196 0.0371 0.248 
  (–2.08)**  (–2.83)*** (0.07) (–1.59) (6.54)*** (5.96)*** (2.31)** (0.25)  
(4) 1.0633  –0.1583 –0.2178 0.0069 –0.6845 0.2777 1.7079 0.4298 0.0288 0.242 
   (–2.01)** (–2.62)*** (0.09) (–1.26) (5.15)*** (5.48)*** (1.68)* (0.20)  
Panel B: Sample IPO companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Quota Management period: 1992–2000 
(5) 1.8381 0.8465  –1.1463 0.2298 –0.5138 0.4723 1.2427 0.5573 0.5193 0.199 
  (1.72)*  (–3.63)*** (0.51) (–4.02)*** (4.62)*** (2.26)** (0.60) (1.99)**  
(6) 1.8394  0.7672 –1.1396 0.2191 –0.5161 0.4734 1.2151 0.5798 0.5153 0.198 
   (2.01)** (–3.23)*** (0.38) (–3.17)*** (3.70)*** (2.12)** (0.63) (2.51)**  
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
(7) 1.1063 –0.1989  –0.3327 0.0418 –0.4186 0.1390 2.2621 0.2911 0.4951 0.325 
  (–2.06)**  (–2.89)*** (0.56) (–0.78) (1.97)** (4.64)*** (2.03)** (1.25)  
(8) 1.1049  –0.1598 –0.3262 0.0370 –0.5522 0.1404 2.2438 0.2847 0.4897 0.323 
   (–1.83)* (–2.88)*** (0.50) (–1.06) (1.98)** (4.55)*** (1.98)** (0.83)  
 
Samples consist of listed companies on the SSE and SZSE, with differences among them. The SSE 
provides listing opportunities for mature and large companies, while the SZSE provides listing 
opportunities for emerging medium- and small-sized hi-tech companies. So the market cap of IPOs on the 
SZSE is smaller, and underpricing is more severe than IPOs on the SSE (see Table 2.1). To eliminate 
potential bias caused by listing on different stock exchanges, Panel B in Table 2.5 only tests samples on 
the SSE. The results in Panel B are similar to those in Panel A: A positive correlation is observed between 
IPO underpricing and underwriter reputation under the old system, but this relationship reverses to 
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negative under the new system. Further research excludes 31 abnormal values, and the discrete value is 
controlled no higher than 2.5 standard deviations. The results in Table 2.6 show no changes in this 
conclusion. 
 
Table 2.6: Analysis of results of the influence of underwriter reputation on IR of IPO companies (abnormal values 
excluded)  
 Intercept REP1 REP2 LNSIZE SEO FLOAT STD MARKET TECH LNLAG Adj. R2 
Panel A: Full sample 
Quota Management period: 1992–2000 
(9) 1.6572 0.3033  –0.4562 0.0159 –0.4391 0.1933 0.4772 0.3368 0.3283 0.177 
  (3.10)***  (–5.44)*** (0.13) (–2.70)*** (3.58)*** (2.16)** (1.55) (3.61)***  
(10) 1.6616  0.2781 –0.4516 0.0111 –0.4662 0.1935 0.4896 0.3523 0.3253 0.166 
   (2.82)*** (–5.38)*** (0.09) (–2.75)*** (3.58)*** (2.22)** (1.61) (3.58)***  
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
(11) 0.8058 –0.2102  –0.2099 0.0029 –0.5129 0.1312 1.2211 0.4672 0.0275 0.257 
  (–2.98)***  (–3.42)*** (0.04) (–1.33) (3.56)*** (5.10)*** (2.90)*** (0.25)  
(12) 0.7643  –0.1124 –0.1913 0.0017 –0.3470 0.1339 1.1902 0.3518 0.0471 0.255 
   (–1.73)* (–3.21)*** (0.03) (–0.90) (3.62)*** (4.91)*** (2.16)** (0.42)  
Panel B: Sample IPOs on SZSE 
Quota Management period:1992–2000 
(13) 1.6179 0.3758  –0.3602 0.1119 –0.5337 0.2399 0.7337 0.2356 0.4073 0.215 
  (2.89)***  (–4.06)*** (0.60) (–3.22)*** (4.99)*** (2.43)** (0.84) (4.32)***  
(14) 1.6081  0.3564 –0.3540 0.1230 –0.5583 0.2405 0.7556 0.2552 0.4034 0.204 
   (2.76)*** (–3.98)*** (0.66) (–3.36)*** (5.02)*** (2.52)** (0.91) (4.30)***  
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
(15) 0.8311 –0.2300  –0.3129 0.0382 –0.1774 0.4748 1.9258 0.2462 0.1258 0.344 
  (–2.63)***  (–3.30)*** (0.55) (–0.37) (1.65)* (4.51)*** (1.88)* (1.02)  
(16) 0.8093  –0.1447 –0.3010 0.0291 –0.4305 0.6476 1.8736 0.2323 0.1550 0.343 





2.2.3.3 Endogenous problems 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Ljungqvist et al. (2003) and Fernando et al. (2005) all think that the 
application of the above regression models may cause errors because underwriter reputation is an 
endogenous variable. To guarantee the validity of both results and conclusions, when measuring REP1 
and REP2, the least square estimation (LSE) of the former period is replaced by a two-stage LSE model. 
Inspired by Tian (2011), this study uses range information between venture capitalists and companies. 
When constructing reputation indexes, investment banks that are closest to each IPO company are 
incorporated into analyses of the two-stage OLS regression model as an instrumental variable. The 
authors of this study maintain that underwriters closer to IPO companies have lower information costs, 
and they are more likely to underwrite for these companies. For example, if an IPO company is located 
near CITIC Securities, it may choose CITIC as its underwriter. Addresses of all listed companies are 
obtained from their prospectuses, and addresses of securities firms are obtained from the Securities 
Association of China (SAC). As headquarters of some securities firms keep changing, researchers have 
checked addresses of all securities firms in the listing announcements of IPO companies. Spatial distance 
between major securities firms and each IPO company is measured by Google maps and the closest 
underwriter to each company is chosen. If one company is underwritten by two or more securities firms, 
distance from the company and its leading underwriter is measured. The one-stage OLS regression model 
includes the instrumental variables (IV) of the closest underwriter to listed company, relative market 
share of underwriters REP1 and other control variables: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1REP IV LNSIZE SEO FLOAT SD MARKET TECH LNLAG                    
2.11 
In the two-stage analysis, the REP1 coefficient gained through the one-stage OLS regression (listed 
below) is used to replace REP1 in regression models (1) and (2) in Table 2.5: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8












Table 2.7:Endogenous problems of two-step OLS (full sample) 
 Intercept IV 1REP  LNSIZE SEO FLOAT STD MARKET TECH LNLAG Adj. R
2 
Panel A: Quota Management period: 1992–2000 
First regression analysis 
 0.4133 0.5202  0.6180 0.1165 –0.2058 0.4048 0.7887 0.1649 0.0637 0.267 
  (1.87)*  (2.02)** (1.37) (–2.10)** (1.50) (2.62)*** (0.87) (1.35)  
Second regression analysis 
(17) 1.8000  0.8364 –0.7179 0.7869 –0.5129 0.5251 0.8271 0.5498 0.0510 0.275 
   (2.10)** (–2.03)** (0.59) (–2.23)** (4.56)*** (3.62)*** (1.28) (1.56)  
Panel B: Approval System period: 2001–2007 
First regression analysis  
 0.4554 0.3624  0.9435 0.1413 –0.7030 0.5996 0.3427 0.2280 0.0694 0.245 
  (1.80)*  (2.91)*** (1.21) (–2.29)** (1.52) (1.82)* (1.18) (1.54)  
Second regression analysis  
(18) 1.0193  –0.9411 –0.6533 0.0335 –0.5759 0.3325 0.9668 0.1775 0.0673 0.348 
   (–2.08)** (–2.34)** (0.43) (–1.84)* (3.35)*** (3.17)*** (0.99) (1.46)  
 
Panels A and B in Table 2.7 show the results of the regression models of all IPOs on the SSE and SZSE. 
As can be seen, under the old and new systems, the positive influence of the IV on underwriter reputation 
stays at the 10 per cent level (t-stat = 1.87; t-stat = 1.80). A correlation coefficient under 0.1 means there 
is no notable correlation between the IV and other residuals in the regression model. An
2R  value of 
26.68 per cent and 24.45 per cent means that these variables hold strong explanatory power in selecting 
underwriters. The two-stage regression analysis shows that in regression models (19) and (20), 
coefficients under the level of 5 per cent are notably positive or negative, which is consistent with the 
conclusions reached previously: Under old or new systems, underwriter reputation exerts notably positive 
or negative influence on IPO underpricing. 
To eliminate the potential confounding influence of exchanges, data from the SSE is used to 
conduct a two-stage OLS regression analysis. The results shown in Table 2.8 do not change our former 
conclusions. Lastly, REP2 is used as a dependent variable and one-stage OLS regressions in Table 2.7 






Table 2.8: Endogenous problems of two-step OLS (based on SSE data)  
 Intercept IV 1REP  LNSIZE SEO FLOAT STD MARKET TECH LNLAG Adj. R
2 
Panel A: Quota Management period:1992–2000 
First regression analysis 
 0.4860 0.5845  0.6820 0.0922 –0.2565 0.4855 0.8095 0.2830 0.0232 0.284 
  (2.23)**  (1.68)* (0.79) (–1.95)* (1.15) (2.41)** (1.21) (0.33)  
Second regression analysis 
(19) 1.6621  0.7241 –0.6524 0.8975 –0.2885 0.5877 0.9239 0.5213 0.6875 0.299 
   (2.15)** (–2.01)** (1.01) (–1.69)* (3.61)*** (3.40)*** (1.52) (2.13)**  
Panel B: Approval System period: 2001–2007 
First regression analysis 
 0.3656 0.5028  0.8135 0.1619 –0.5159 0.2279 0.4495 0.3061 0.6166 0.301 
  (2.20)**  (2.67)*** (1.03) (–2.30)** (1.11) (1.97)* (1.13) (2.17)**  
Second regression analysis  
(20) 1.1500  –0.9888 –0.5154 0.0250 –0.4918 0.2870 0.5878 0.2306 0.0750 0.325 
   (–2.06)** (–2.21)** (0.30) (–1.93)* (2.02)** (2.45)** (1.51) (0.33)  
 
2.2.4 Case study and analyses of long-term returns for IPOs 
2.2.4.1 Long-term returns for IPOs 
Table 2.9 shows average long-term returns for IPOs adjusted for pair companies 36 months after listing. 
On the left of Panel A, the three-year BHAR (–6.96 per cent) is significantly negative (t-stat = –3.32) at 
the 1 per cent level. This means that under the old system, long-term IPO returns are lower than their pair 
companies. When the CAR approach adjusted for pair companies is applied, pronounced long-term 
underperformance disappears. As shown on the right of Panel A, three-year CAR (–1.40 per cent) is not 
significant (t-stat = –1.61). Panel B also shows disparities in long-term IPO returns under the new system. 
These research results show that emerging markets confirm the views of Fama (1998) – specific samples 
or markets alone cannot explain the sensitivity of observed values of long-term return selection methods. 
Additionally, the underperformance identified in this research is less severe and less significant than 
previous studies (Chen et al., 2000; Chan et al., 2004; Cai et al., 2008). For instance, Cai et al.(2008) 
studied 335 IPOs on the SSE between 1997 and 2001. The average three-year BHAR and CAR adjusted 
for market index were respectively –29.57 per cent (t-stat=15.27) and–24.97 per cent (t-stat=10.89). Such 
differences are presumably caused by different benchmarks – Cai et. al.(2008) used the SSE index or the 




Table 2.9: Long-term performance of IPO companies 
  BHARs  CARs 
Event Time N BHRi,t BHRm,t BHART tsa(BHART)  ARt t(ARt) CART t(CART) 
Panel A: Quota Management period: 1992–2000 
3 832 1.870 1.872 –0.002 (–0.03)  –0.186 (–1.23) –0.737 (–1.12) 
6 832 8.590 8.631 –0.040 (–0.14)  –0.096 (–1.11) –0.877 (–1.36) 
9 832 13.808 13.957 –0.149 (–0.21)  0.085 (1.02) –0.716 (–1.25) 
12 (1 year) 832 17.175 17.605 –0.430 (–0.59)  0.001 (0.01) –0.732 (–1.29) 
15 832 18.676 19.683 –1.007 (–1.11)  0.021 (0.32) –0.703 (–1.11) 
18 832 23.184 25.239 –2.055 (–1.59)  –0.023 (–0.36) –0.796 (–1.25) 
21 832 28.439 31.800 –3.361 (–1.94)  –0.058 (–0.80) –0.996 (–1.32) 
24 (2 years) 832 32.452 36.630 –4.178 (–2.28)  0.014 (0.23) –0.988 (–1.30) 
27 832 36.289 41.116 –4.827 (–2.31)  0.090 (0.89) –0.897 (–1.41) 
30 832 38.925 44.346 –5.421 (–2.54)  –0.002 (–0.01) –0.924 (–1.45) 
33 832 48.206 54.491 –6.284 (–3.01)  –0.079 (–0.89) –1.201 (–1.56) 
36 (3 years) 832 59.576 66.534 –6.958 (–3.32)  –0.052 (–0.56) –1.395 (–1.61) 
Panel B: Approval System period: 2001-2007 
3 519 –2.543 –2.506 –0.037 (–0.05)  –0.031 (–1.23) –0.910 (–1.21) 
6 519 –0.610 –0.142 –0.468 (–0.51)  –0.053 (–0.56) –1.277 (–1.32) 
9 519 –2.210 –1.067 –1.144 (–0.96)  –0.032 (–0.32) –1.409 (–1.45) 
12 (1year)  519 –4.489 –3.005 –1.484 (–1.25)  0.019 (0.24) –1.338 (–1.36) 
15 519 –6.356 –4.352 –2.004 (–1.78)  –0.139 (–1.36) –1.496 (–1.41) 
18 519 –12.463 –9.644 –2.819 (–1.98)  –0.273 (–2.20) –1.947 (–1.65) 
21 519 –17.412 –13.891 –3.522 (–2.23)  0.123 (1.09) –1.660 (–1.69) 
24 (2 years) 519 –15.301 –10.936 –4.365 (–2.54)  0.034 (0.35) –1.604 (–1.41) 
27 519 –9.107 –4.430 –4.677 (–3.01)  0.019 (0.25) –1.400 (–1.25) 
30 519 6.025 10.539 –4.514 (–3.11)  0.264 (2.23) –0.938 (–0.89) 
33 519 27.590 31.363 –3.773 (–2.98)  0.034 (–0.41) –0.837 (–0.78) 
36 (3 years) 519 49.467 51.910 –2.443 (–2.69)  0.092 (–0.85) –0.679 (–0.69) 
 
2.2.4.2 Analysis of long-term IPO returns with two reputation variables 
When studying samples from old- and new-system groups, all IPOs are divided into low-reputation 
(whose REP1 in the lowest 30 per cent), medium-reputation (REP1 in the middle 40 per cent) and high-
reputation groups (REP1 in the highest 30 per cent). As shown in Table 2.10, during the old system 
period, the average three-year BHAR of each group is near to the full-sample BHAR median. Contrasts 
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between every two of the BHARs of these three groups are not significant in either parametric or non-
parametric tests. It is also found that during the new-system period, and for each group, there is a 
monotonic positive correlation between IPOs and REP1: The average BHARs for low-reputation, 
medium-reputation and high-reputation groups are respectively –8.07 per cent, –3.16 per cent and 
3.65 per cent. Contrasts between every two of the BHARs of the three groups are significant in parametric 
and non-parametric tests: The average BHARs of the high-reputation and low-reputation groups hold 
significant disparities at the 1 per cent level (t-stat = 3.69; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 24.45). Grouping by REP2 
yields consistent results and is not listed here to avoid repetition. 
 
Table 2.10: Multivariate analysis of long-term IPO performance 
 Quota Management period: 1992–2000  Approval System period: 2001–2007 
 N Mean Median St. Dev.  N Mean Median St. Dev. 
Low REP1 
30 per cent 
241 –6.86 –5.69 24.56  143 –8.07 –8.72 32.18 
Median REP1 
40 per cent 
321 –7.03 –5.47 23.41  191 –3.16 –3.45 25.54 
High REP1 
30 per cent 
241 –6.97 –6.31 22.19  143 4.15 3.65 26.36 
All 832 –6.96 –5.36 21.58  519 –2.44 –3.25 24.65 
 t-stat χ2  t-stat χ2 
Low vs. 
Median 
(0.96) (1.74)  (2.96)*** (21.65)*** 
Median vs. 
High 
(0.28) (0.63)  (3.14)*** (22.69)*** 
Low vs. High (0.69) (1.50)  (3.69)*** (24.45)*** 
 
2.2.4.3 Result analysis of cross-section OLS regression
 
The results shown in Panel A of Table 2.11 are based on the full sample from both the SSE and SZSE 
with REP1 and REP2 as proxy variables for underwriter reputation. The results show that, during the old-
system period, coefficients for REP1 and REP2 are not significant (see regression models (21) and (22)). 
However, during the new-system period, coefficients for REP1 and REP2 are significantly positive (see 
regression models (23) and (24)), which is consistent with the results in Table 2.10. To exclude the 
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influence of exchanges on listed companies, samples on the SSE are used to conduct a duplication check. 
The results in Panel B are found to be similar to those in Panel A. 
To test the robustness of these results, the 3-year average BHAR adjusted for pair companies is 
used as a dependent variable. This test confirms the results: The conclusions drawn by using LNBHAR 
are unchanged. Also, samples without the 23 abnormal values are used to repeat all tests in Table 2.11; 
the conclusions likewise hold. To exclude deviations or errors in the regression analysis caused by the 
endogeneity of the reputation variable, this research adopts a two-stage OLS (similar to the approach 
applied in Table 2.8), which again confirms the conclusions. 
 
Table 2.11: Crosstab regression analysis of long-term IPO performance 
 Intercept REP1 REP2 LnSIZE SEO FLOAT STD MARKET TECH LnLAG Adj. R2 
Panel A: Full sample 
Quota management period: 1992–2000 
 
(21) 2.3602 0.0170  –0.0146 0.0267 0.0931 –0.3365 0.0300 0.0120 –0.0154 0.053 
  (0.57)   (–2.40)** (3.56)***  (2.27)** (–1.37) (0.89) (1.48) (–2.11)**  
(22) 2.3336  0.0163 –0.0145 0.0270 0.0906 –0.3273 0.0306 0.0098 –0.0157 0.162 
   (0.55) (–2.39)** (3.59)*** (2.20)** (–1.14) (0.91) (1.21) (–2.14)**  
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
(23) 2.1635 0.1035  –0.0070 0.0155 0.0218 –0.2667 0.1053 0.0146 –0.0049 0.153 
  (2.29)**  (–1.30) (1.83)* (0.31) (–0.75) (1.93)* (1.32) (–0.39)  
(24) 2.1485  0.0869 –0.0069 0.0156 0.0186 –0.2762 0.1052 0.0155 –0.0053 0.160 
   (2.14)** (–1.30) (1.83)* (0.27) (–0.82) (1.94)* (1.35) (–0.42)  
Panel B: IPOs samples on SSE 
Quota management period: 1992–2000 
 
(25) 2.3572 0.0233  –0.0119 0.0235 0.0810 –0.2332 0.0181 0.0053 –0.0147 0.044 
  (0.58)  (–1.97)** (2.77)*** (1.83)* (–0.99) (0.33) (0.44) (–1.82)*  
(26) 2.3368  0.0218 –0.0108 0.0237 0.0798 –0.2109 0.0184 0.0057 –0.0150 0.133 
   (0.52) (–1.95)* (2.79)*** (1.80)* (–0.91) (0.34) (0.48) (–1.71)*  
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
(27) 2.1556 0.0978  –0.0062 0.0182 0.0290 –0.2143 0.0715 0.0142 –0.0050 0.141 
  (1.97)**  (–0.88) (1.72)* (0.33) (–0.89) (1.65)* (1.36) (–0.55)  
(28) 2.1432  0.0988 –0.0063 0.0180 0.0388 –0.2144 0.0788 0.0146 –0.0051 0.141 
   (2.06)** (–0.89) (1.72)* (0.44) (–0.89) (1.79)* (1.38) (–0.59)  
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2.2.4.4 Long-term IPO return based on Calendar Time 
In the case of the Event Time approach, t-statistics create dependence among cross sections. To solve this 
problem, the Calendar Time returns for IPOs are tested by t-statistics using the time sequence of samples. 
First, for each month from January 1994 to December 2008, an investment portfolio is constructed that 
covers listings in the previous 36 months. Then, the monthly returns of each IPO investment portfolio are 
calculated and adjusted for the market-cap weighted SSE and SZSE or stock indexes. Table 2.12 shows 
abnormal monthly average returns in every calendar year. At the 10 per cent level, abnormal monthly 
average returns are slightly significant: –0.89 per cent (t-stat =1.87) under the old system and –0.22 per 
cent (t-stat = –1.95) under the new system. 
 
Table 2.12: Abnormal rates of return to IPO portfolios based on Calendar Time 
    Proxy Variable of Underwriter Reputation (REP1) 
Calendar Year r Full Sample  Low  High  High –low 
1994 –2.294  –2.385 –2.203 0.183 
1995 1.288  1.309 1.268 –0.041 
1996 0.330  0.319 0.340 0.021 
1997 –2.159  –2.335 –1.982 0.353 
1998 1.317  1.453 1.181 –0.272 
1999 0.063  0.032 0.095 0.063 
2000 0.042  0.074 0.011 –0.064 
2001 –1.325  –1.335 –1.314 0.021 
2002 –1.226  –1.442 –1.011 0.430 
2003 –1.224  –1.333 –1.116 0.217 
2004 0.949  0.567 1.331 0.764 
2005 –1.154  –1.252 –1.055 0.198 
2006 0.697  0.531 0.863 0.332 
2007 2.261  2.105 2.417 0.312 
2008 –1.211  –1.424 –0.998 0.426 
Quota management period: 1994–2000 –0.894  –0.874 –0.746 0.128 
t-stat  (–1.87)*  (–1.89)* (–1.48) (0.41) 
Approval System period: 2001–2008 –0.218  –0.361 0.124 0.485 
t-stat  (–1.95)*  (–2.86)** (0.69) (3.21)*** 
 
Secondly, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model are 
used to test the significance of the long-term returns. Weights of each month for OLS are the same, so if 
the number of IPOs in investment portfolios is correlated, then over-performance or underperformance 
will be reduced (Gompers and Lerner, 2003). To solve this problem, regression is done with a weighted 
least squares (WLS) method, where the weight of the observed value is the square root of the number of 
IPOs in an investment portfolio. According to Table 2.13, the intercepts of the new and old system do not 
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depart from zero significantly, showing that IPOs do not show significant abnormal rates of return with 
the Calendar Time approach. This is consistent with previous research done by Ritter and Welch (2002). 
To verify the conclusions reached by using Event Time, Calendar Time is used to test their 
robustness. All IPOs are divided into low-reputation and high-reputation groups, based on their median 
REP1. The last column of Table 2.12 shows that, during the old-system period, the monthly average 
abnormal returns of portfolios in the low-REP1 and high-REP1 groups do not hold significant 
differences. However, during the new-system period at the 1 per cent level, the monthly average 
abnormal return of the high-REP1 group is significantly higher than that of the low-REP1 group, with the 
latter standing at 0.49 per cent (t-stat = 3.21). 
 
Table 2.13: Multi-factor WLS regression of IPO portfolios  
    Proxy Variable for Underwriter Reputation (REP1) 
  Full sample   Low  High  High –low 
Panel A: Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model 
Quota management period: 1992–2000 
Intercept Coefficient –0.0016  –0.0020 –0.0017 0.0002 
 t-stat (–1.06)  (–1.44) (–1.24) (–0.05) 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.5736  0.5298 0.5076 –0.0222 
 t-stat (3.87)***  (3.82)*** (3.85)*** (–0.27) 
SMB Coefficient 1.3809  1.4735 1.4172 –0.0563 
 t-stat (2.99)***  (2.33)** (2.22)** (–1.33) 
HML Coefficient –0.3841  –0.4313 –0.4657 –0.0344 
 t-stat (–0.86)  (–0.77) (–0.76) (–0.20) 
Adj. R2  0.291  0.286 0.282 0.129 
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
Intercept Coefficient –0.0018  –0.0023 0.0009 0.0032 
 t-stat (–1.19)  (–1.54) (–0.72) (2.64)*** 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.6061  0.6370 0.6486 0.0116 
 t-stat (4.02)***  (3.67)*** (3.76)*** (0.06) 
SMB Coefficient 1.5604  1.6342 1.4886 –0.1456 
 t-stat (2.86)***  (2.33)** (2.46)** (–0.77) 
HML Coefficient –0.4119  –0.3732 –0.4479 –0.0747 
 t-stat (–1.06)  (–0.81) (–0.85) (–0.59) 
Adj. R2  0.300  0.297 0.300 0.112 
Panel B: Carhart (1997) 4-factor model  
Quota management period: 1992–2000 
Intercept Coefficient –0.0015  –0.0016 –0.0015 0.0001 
 t-stat ((–1.49)  (–1.27) (–1.24) (–0.03) 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.6418  0.6526 0.6513 –0.0012 
 t-stat (4.32)***  (4.27)*** (4.29)*** (–0.25) 
SMB Coefficient 1.4853  1.4902 1.3938 –0.0964 
 t-stat (2.78)***  (2.49)** (2.21)** (–1.21) 
HML Coefficient –0.4060  –0.4148 –0.4546 –0.0399 
 t-stat (–0.81)  (–0.81) (–0.79) (–0.32) 
MOM Coefficient 0.3754  0.3814 0.3671 –0.0142 
 t-stat (–0.95)  (–0.97) (–0.86) (–0.41) 
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Adj. R2  0.311  0.259 0.318 0.117 
Approval System period: 2001–2007 
Intercept Coefficient –0.0017  –0.0021 0.0008 0.0029 
 t-stat (–1.70)  (–1.82) (–0.67) (2.56)*** 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.7324  0.6328 0.5744 –0.0584 
 t-stat (4.01)***  (3.91)*** (3.83)*** (–0.58) 
SMB Coefficient 1.5376  1.5503 1.5235 –0.0269 
 t-stat (2.65)**  (2.14)** (2.73)*** (–1.02) 
HML Coefficient –0.3518  –0.4059 –0.4312 –0.0253 
 t-stat (–0.86)  (–0.63) (–0.71) (–0.27) 
MOM Coefficient 0.3829  0.3738 0.3506 –0.0233 
 t-stat (–1.02)  (–1.09) (–0.97) (–0.69) 
Adj. R2  0.304  0.283 0.242 0.098 
 
Regression analyses of the high-REP1, low-REP1 and high-low REP1 portfolios are conducted with the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. As can be seen in 
Table 2.13, during the old-system period, the intercept of the high-low REP1 group is not statistically 
significant (t-stat = –0.05), but it is significant at the 1 per cent level during the new-system period (t-stat 
= 2.64). Generally speaking, during the new-system period, underwriter reputation exerts significant 
positive influence on the IPO long-term returns .This result is robust under the regression test based on 
groupings by median REP1. 
2.2.5 Conclusions 
This study has analyzed 1,351 IPOs in China’s stock market in the old- and new-system periods (1992–
2000 and 2001–7) to examine the influence of underwriters on IPO price performance. The comparative 
market share of each securities firm and the number of IPOs underwritten are used to measure 
underwriter reputation. Conclusions are as follows. (1) During the old-system period, underwriter 
reputation exerted positive influence on IPO underpricing, but during the new-system period, the 
influence was negative. (2) During the old-system period, underwriter reputation had no influence on the 
long-term performance of IPOs, but during the new-system period, there were significant positive 
influences. These results not only provide valuable empirical findings for research centered upon 
emerging markets, they are also of great value for investors and decision-makers. Reform of the IPO 
system in China leaves more freedom and initiative for underwriters, mitigates high underpricing, and 
boosts long-term IPO performance. Indeed, the conclusion that underwriter reputation under the new 
system positively impacts long-term IPO performance holds special meaning for those investment banks 
who are interested in investing in China’s capital market but lack knowledge of China’s listing market.4 
                                                 
4 In November 2002, China Securities Regulatory Commission and People’s Bank of China rolled out the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) to prepare China’s capital market for foreign capital 
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Though BHARs for the full sample are negative (meaning that investors who hold Chinese IPOs long-
term may suffer losses), investments in IPOs underwritten by prestigious underwriters are subject to 
slimmer changes in losses. Various potentially confounding factors do not change this conclusion: The 
influence of stock exchanges is eliminated through using solely IPO samples on the SSE; extreme values 
are excluded to rule out the influence of abnormal values; a two-stage OLS model controls endogenous 
problems. Under these circumstances, the results remain robust. 
2.3 Regulation of IPO information disclosure 
2.3.1 Regulatory systems guiding information disclosure of listed companies in China 
2.3.1.1 Basic principles for information disclosure of listed companies 
The basic principles for information disclosure of listed companies are specific regulations that include 
mandatory requirements and restraints dealing with the content, form and time of information disclosures. 
These principles are yardsticks for the obligations of listed companies regarding information disclosure. 
Throughout the development of securities markets around the world, basic principles guiding information 
disclosure of listed companies should, at minimum, cover authenticity, adequacy, accuracy, promptness 
and fairness. 
(1) Authenticity 
Authenticity requires subjects of information disclosure duties to provide information objectively with no 
intentional interference from investors and to uphold the fairness of investment decisions based on 
authentic investment judgments. It requires that objective facts or judgments and opinions based on facts 
be the basis of decisions and condemns any false record. 
Disclosed information can be divided according to its nature into several categories: Descriptive 
information, evaluative information and predictive information. Accordingly, in law, there is descriptive 
authenticity, evaluative authenticity and predictive authenticity. Descriptive information reflects facts. 
The authenticity of descriptive information pertains to whether it refers to facts and whether information 
disclosed by the responsible subject is objective and consistent. Evaluative information is any analysis or 
valuation of the nature, result or influence of facts. It postulates a correlation between facts revealed by 
disclosed information and other facts. Evaluative authenticity is truth in logic. To verify evaluative 
authenticity, facts reflected by descriptive information must first be identified. Then the veracity of their 
evaluation, as well as the rationality of the evaluation methods, are judged. The safe harbor rule – set up 
by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – is a feasible method to test the 
authenticity of predictive information. The rule requires that the profitability forecasts disclosed by 
                                                 
flow. By January 2008, 52 foreign institutions have gained QFII licenses of 50 million to 800 million 
US dollars. A total of about 10 billion US dollars have been allowed into China’s capital market. 
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issuers must be honest and rational. If the matter of facts is not as predicted, and issuers are proven to 
have violated the principle of honesty, then they must be held accountable. 
(2) Adequacy 
Adequacy means that all information that may greatly influence investors’ decision-making must be 
disclosed, even when it is not explicitly stipulated in regulations or contracts. Listed companies must 
disclose all relevant information adequately, completely and fairly; no major omissions or concealments 
are allowed. Adequate disclosure includes completeness, significance and certain reserved rights and 
privacy. 
Completeness means that materials provided to investors for judging the value of securities must 
be recorded in statutory documents and published. There must be no intentional concealment, deficiency 
or major omissions. Completeness asks companies to disclose all information. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board of the United States (FASB) establishes the definition 
of ‘significance’: Based on the surrounding environments, if omissions or misstatement of accounting 
information may change or influence a rational person’s judgment, then the information is deemed 
significant. According to the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), ‘if omissions or 
mistakes in materials could influence the economic decisions of users who act upon financial statements, 
then such materials are of significance’. Completeness and significance are contradictory, but mutually 
conducive; both are indispensable for effective disclosure. Incomplete information may mislead investors; 
intentional concealments and major omissions are no different from falsification. However, irrelevant 
(that is insignificant) information adds no value to applications; disclosure costs are heightened without 
any benefit. What is worse, insignificant information adds ‘noise’ to the complex information 
environment of stock markets. 
Certain reserved rights and privacy mean that, under some circumstances, even though 
information is significant, if immediate disclosure may bring about detrimental and irreparable losses to 
the disclosing party, then such information can be concealed or be subject to partial disclosure. According 
to the Provisional Regulations on Administration of Share Issuance and Trading, information in the 
following circumstances can be immune from disclosure: 1) Business secrets protected by laws and 
regulations and prescribed to not be subject to disclosure; 2) Non-public information and documents 
obtained by the CSRC during investigations of illegalities; 3) Other information and documents that are 
stipulated to be free from disclosure in relevant laws and regulations. 
(3) Accuracy 
Accuracy means that, when disclosing information, listed companies must express statements precisely, 
and the content and means of expression must not be misleading. Thus the accuracy principle is also 
known as ‘content legibility’. Statements deemed to conflict with the accuracy principle are termed by 
law as ‘misleading’. So the accuracy principle does not emphasize consistency between disclosed 
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information and facts reflected by it. Rather, it emphasizes a consistent understanding of the same 
information between the disclosing party and information recipients (as well as between recipients 
themselves). Accuracy calls for objectivity; it forbids overstatement or misleading statements. 
To apply the accuracy principle, standards for understanding or interpreting the content of 
information disclosed must be established. If laws explicitly state the standards (such as accounting 
standards) for information disclosure, listed companies must disclose information in accordance with 
these standards. If there are no such legal standards, listed companies must disclose information 
according to the common meanings of language and words. Understanding and the interpretation of 
disclosed content must be based on the qualities of common investors. 
(4) Promptness 
Promptness means listed companies do not delay legal information disclosure and that the delivery of 
public materials lies within legal time limits. This principle emphasizes that disclosed information is the 
most up-to-date. That is to say, promptness aims to shorten the time between information creation and 
release, so as to prevent insider trading or market manipulation. 
There are several requirements for promptness. First, regular disclosure reports must be drafted 
and released within legal time limits. Second, disclosures must be made within the legally stipulated time 
in cases of temporary and unforeseeable major events. Third, if disclosed information is no longer 
authentic, accurate or complete due to objective factors, then timely revision, correction and/or 
clarification must be made. 
Prompt disclosure of relevant information enables investors to make rational investment decisions 
based on the latest information. In this way, losses caused by information failures can be avoided, the 
amounts involved in insider trading can be reduced, time frames for insider trading are squeezed, and in 
general insider trading is curbed. 
(5) Fairness 
Fairness means that important information is disclosed to all market parties so that all investors enjoy 
equal access and opportunity to gain information of the same quality and quantity. 
The Regulation Fair Disclosure promulgated by the SEC in 2000 requires that, when a company 
discloses non-public information to market professionals or shareholders who may use the information to 
trade, it must disclose equally detailed information to the public. General information accessible for 
investors is a combination of information about the company. It may come from information 
intermediaries, be formed by investors based on public information, or be inferred from market prices. 
Despite information sources, investors are entitled to share equal rights with professional investment 
institutions in gaining information. 
According to the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure by Listed Companies 
promulgated by the CSRC, listed companies and relevant responsible parties of information disclosure 
44 
 
must disclose information to all investors at the same time so that all investors receive the information 
equally. Listed companies that issue shares or derivatives on both domestic and oversea markets must 
disclose information at the same time on both the domestic market and foreign markets. Listed companies 
and relevant responsible parties must not use press conferences or question-and-answer sessions to 
replace reports and announcements. 
2.3.1.2 Legal framework of information disclosure for listed companies in China 
Since the inception of China’s securities market, the country has been working on an information 
disclosure system. Now a multi-dimensional and multi-level legal framework for information disclosure 
by listed companies has taken initial shape. The Securities Law serves as the framework’s basis, with 
normative documents such as administrative laws, regulations, and department rules serving as 
supplements. The first level of the legal framework is basic laws – primarily the Securities Law, Company 
Law and provisions in the Criminal Law. The second level is composed of administrative laws and 
regulations, including the Provisional Regulations on Administration of Share Issuance and Trading, 
Regulations on Foreign Capital Stocks Listed in China by Joint-stock Companies, and so on. The third 
level involves department rules, including the following: 
- Administrative Regulations on Information Disclosure by Listed Companies 
- Administrative Regulations on IPO Issuance and Listing 
- Rules for the Compilation and Submission of Information Disclosure by Companies That Offer 
Securities to the Public 
- Rules for the Content and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies That Offer 
Securities to the Public [No.1] 
- Prospectus Rules for the Content and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies That 
Offer Securities to the Public [No.9] 
- Application Documents for IPO and Listing 
- Opinions on Issues Concerning Further Enhancing Quality of Financial Information Disclosure 
by IPO Companies. 
The fourth level entails self-regulatory rules, such as the Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, Guidelines for Report Formats, Memorandum on Information Disclosure and 
other notices and guidelines drafted by the SSE and SZSE. With these laws and regulations, China has 
established a system for information disclosure, specified relevant standards, and guaranteed 
implementation of the system by law. 
2.3.1.3 Legal Liabilities of information disclosure for listed companies in China 
(1) Administrative responsibilities 
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(i) Securities law 
Article 193: Issuers, when listed companies or other subjects with a duty of disclosure fail to disclose 
information as stipulated, or information disclosed by them contains false records, misleading statements 
or major omissions, must be instructed to correct the information, be warned, and be made subject to 
penalties ranging from CNY300,000 to CNY600,000. Persons in direct charge and others directly 
responsible must be warned and subject to penalties ranging from CNY30,000 to CNY300,000. 
When issuers, listed companies or other subjects with a duty to disclose fail to submit a relevant 
report, or the submitted report contains false records, misleading statements or major omissions, they 
must be instructed to correct the information, be warned and be made subject to penalties ranging from 
CNY300,000 to CNY600,000. Persons in direct charge and other persons directly responsible must be 
warned and be made subject to penalties ranging from CNY30,000 to CNY300,000. 
When issuers, listed companies or controlling shareholders or actual controllers of other subjects 
with a duty to disclose violate provisions in the above two paragraphs, punishments and penalties must be 
dealt out as prescribed in said paragraphs. 
(ii) Administrative regulations on IPO issuance and listing 
Article 64: In the following circumstances, punishments will be meted out in accordance with the 
Securities Law, and the CSRC will suspend approval and reject issuance applications filed by the issuers 
in the following 36 months: When issuance documents submitted by issuers to the CSRC contain false 
records, misleading statements or major omissions; when issuers that fail to meet conditions for issuance 
defraud issuance approvals through deception; when issuers interfere by improper means in approval by 
the CSRC and the Issuance Review Committee under it; when signatures or stamps of issuers or directors, 
supervisors or senior management staff are forged or altered. 
(iii) Administrative regulations on information disclosure by listed companies 
Article 59: When subjects with a duty to disclose or their directors, supervisors, senior management staff, 
or shareholders, actual controller, buyer, director, supervisor or senior management staff of listed 
companies violate provisions of the Regulations, the CSRC may take the following regulatory measures: 
1) Communicating instructions to correct violations; 2) regulatory talks; 3) issuing warning letters; 4) 
recording illegalities and failure to honor public commitments on credit, filing them, and releasing them; 
5) categorizing the relevant parties as inappropriate candidates; 6) other regulatory measures. 
Article 61: When subjects with a duty to disclose fail to fulfill their obligations of information 
disclosure within the stipulated time limits, or disclosed information contains false records, misleading 




Article 63: When listed companies conceal correlations or use other means to evade information 
disclosure or the obligations of submitting reports, they must be punished by the CSRC in accordance 
with Article 193 in the Securities Law. 
Article 69: When listed companies and other subjects with a duty to disclose violate provisions in 
these Regulations and the circumstances are grave, the CSRC may inhibit access to market for the 
involved person in charge. 
(2) Civil liability 
(i) Securities law 
Article 69: When a prospectus, corporate bond financing procedures, financial and accounting reports, 
listing reports, annual reports, interim reports, provisional reports and other information disclosure 
materials of issuers or listed companies contain false records, misleading statements or major omissions 
and losses are incurred on investors in securities transactions, issuers and listed companies must shoulder 
the responsibility of compensation. Except for those that can prove themselves in absence of fault, 
directors, supervisors, senior management staff and other persons in direct charge of issuers and listed 
companies, and their sponsors and underwriters, must assume joint and several liabilities. Controlling 
shareholders or actual controllers of issuers or listed companies in fault must assume joint and several 
liabilities together with issuers and listed companies. 
(ii) Several rules of the Supreme People’s Court on civil compensation incurred 
by false statements in the securities markets 
When subjects with a duty to disclose violate provisions of securities laws and make false records or 
misleading statements in the course of securities issuance or transactions, or when disclosed information 
contains major omissions, or when illegal information disclosure occurs, investors in the securities market 
may file a suit for civil compensation to the people’s courts, on grounds that the subjects in question 
violated laws and made false statements that incurred losses. 
(3) Criminal liabilities 
(i) Criminal law 
Article 161: When companies and enterprises that are legally liable to disclose information release false 
information to shareholders and the public, or conceal major facts in financial and accounting reports, or 
disclose information out of compliance with laws and regulations, if the interests of shareholders and 
others are harmed or there are other grave circumstances, persons in direct charge and other directly 
responsible persons must be sentenced to less than three years in prison or sentenced to penal servitude, 
and/or subject to penalties ranging from CNY20,000 to CNY200,000. 
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2.3.2 Problems of regulation of IPO information disclosure 
Currently in China, the regulators of IPO information disclosure are mainly the CSRC, the SSE, the SZSE 
and the China Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA). They have different duties and 
authority. The CSRC enjoys the most power and authority among them. Exchanges like the SSE and 
SZSE are the frontline of regulation, but their power is limited.  CICPA impose indirect supervision and 
regulation on IPO information disclosure through supervision and regulation of accounting firms. 
In recent years, illegal IPO information disclosures have been rampant, despite strict prohibitions. 
Cases like those of Yunnan Greenland Biological Technology Co., Ltd and Wanfu Biotechnology show 
an increasing trend. Problems in regulating IPO information disclosure mainly include three aspects. 
2.3.2.1 Punishments meted out to fraudulent listings are too light
 
In May 2013, the CSRC wrote ‘the strictest ticket in regulatory history’ to Wanfu Biotechnology and 
involved intermediaries that were charged with fraudulent listing. Wanfu Biotechnology was instructed to 
correct the illegalities, warned, and fined CNY300,000; Gong Yongfu – chairman of the board of 
directors – was warned and fined CNY300,000; Yan Pinggui and another 18 senior managers were 
warned and fined in three grades: CNY250,000, CNY100,000 and CNY50,000. In addition, Gong 
Yongfu and Tan Xuejun were forbidden from accessing the securities market for life. Fraudulent listings 
conducted and false records fabricated by Gong Yongfu and Tan Xuejun were suspected as criminal acts, 
so they were transferred to public security authorities to be prosecuted as such. 
During the listing of Wanfu Biotechnology, three intermediaries – the sponsor Ping An 
Securities, the audit body Zhonglei Accounting Firm and Boao Law Firm, and relevant persons in charge, 
failed to discharge their duties. Materials presented by them contained false records. The CSRC issued 
warnings to Ping An Securities and confiscated CNY25.55 million in business income gained from the 
listing of Wanfu. Penalties of two times the income were meted out, and its sponsor certification was 
suspended for three months. The CSRC fined Wu Wenhao and He Tao – sponsor representatives of 
Wanfu programs – CNY300,000 each. Their certifications as sponsor representatives and securities 
practice qualifications were revoked, and they were forbidden from accessing the securities market for 
life. Xue Rongnian, Zeng Niansheng – persons in charge of sponsoring – and Cui Ling – the person in 
charge of internal audits – were fined CNY300,000 each and their securities practice qualifications were 
revoked. The co-sponsor of Wanfu’s listing was warned and fined CNY100,000; his securities practice 
qualification was also revoked. CNY1.38 million in business income gained by Zhonglei Law Firm was 
confiscated, a fine of two times the income was meted out, and the firm’s certificate of securities services 
was revoked. Wang Yue and Huang Guohua – accountants who signed off on the listing programs and 
materials – were fined CNY100,000 and CNY130,000, respectively. They were further forbidden from 




Compared with the punishments in the case of Yunnan Greenland Biological Technology 
Company, the CSRC intensified the gravity and scope of punishments in the Wanfu case. Previously, 
Greenland Biological Technology Company had inflated assets and business incomes, causing a sensation 
at the time. The CSRC meted out the following punishments: Greenland Biological Technology Company 
was instructed to correct its mistakes, warned, and fined CNY600,000. He Xuekui – the former chairman 
of the board – and Jiang Kaixi – incumbent director and chief financial officer (CFO) – were both banned 
from the securities market for life. Incumbent chairman of the board of directors Zhao Hongquan, 
directors Hu Hong, Li Gang, Zhong Jiafu, Pu Le, Luo Xiaoyin and Tan Huanzhu, incumbent general 
manager Mao Zhiming and Xu Yunkui, and incumbent vice general manager Chen Desheng were warned 
and fined CNY300,000 each. Independent director Zheng Yaguang was warned and fined CNY100,000. 
The CSRC also planned to hand out administrative punishments to intermediaries of United 
Securities, Sichuan Tianchengmen Law Firm and Shenzhen Pengcheng Accounting Firm. The securities 
service certificate of Shenzhen Pengcheng Accounting Firm was revoked; persons responsible were 
subject to administrative penalties and banned from the securities market for life; certifications for 
sponsor representatives and securities practice held by the involved sponsor representatives were revoked. 
The Intermediate People’s Court of Kunming made the following statements in the first trial of 
the Greenland case: The Greenland Company was affirmed to have committed crimes of fraudulent 
issuance of shares, forging finance tickets and deliberately destroying accounting documents, and was 
fined CNY10.4 million; He Xuekui was sentenced to ten years in prison; Jiang Kaixi, Pang Mingxing, 
Zhao Haili and Zhao Haiyan were also sentenced to imprisonment, ranging from 27 months to six years 
and penalties. 
Such punishments are too mild compared with the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong 
Kong’s (SFC) handling of the Hontex case. Hontex International was listed on the main board of the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) on 24 December 2009. It was suspend on 30 March 2010 due to 
charges from the HKSE of major falsified or misleading data in its prospectus. As the sole book runner, 
lead agent and sponsor of Hontex International on the HKSE, Mega Capital Asia was forbidden to 
provide opinions to financial institutions, fined HKD42 million and its license was revoked. The HKSE 
has also noted that banks or other institutions that serve as sponsors must be subject to criminal liabilities 
if their prospectus contains untrue statements. 
2.3.2.2 Absence of a civil compensation mechanism in case of fraudulent listings 
A civil compensation mechanism forces violators to compensate for losses inflicted upon investors. It can 
not only deprive violators of illegal gains, but also forcibly impose a massive economic burden on them. 
The accountability provided by civil compensation also motivates investors to engage in their own 
monitoring. In developed markets, the most intimidating downside to fraud is not criminal litigations or 




Taking Hong Kong’s securities market as an example, the HKSFC cracks down hard on 
fraudulent listings, pledging zero tolerance towards them. The Hontex International case is vivid evidence 
of this commitment. On 24 December 2009, Hontex International listed on the HKSE at HKD2.15 per 
share and raised HKD1.075 billion. But the SFC found out through investigations that reported business 
volume, pre-tax earnings and cash data were not consistent with facts. Turnover was inflated by over 
CNY2 billion, profits by CNY600 million, and there were several instances of false or exaggerated 
statements in its prospectus. In 2008, when the international financial crisis kicked in, the gross profit 
margin of Hontex International stood far higher than that of its peers, and it completed listing with broken 
statements. On application by the SFC, Justice Harris of the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong’s High 
Court ordered Hontex International to propose buy-back to investors who offered to buy Hontex shares or 
those who bought Hontex shares on the secondary market. The price of the buy-back was set at HKD2.06 
per share – the closing price of Hontex upon suspension. The court ordered Hontex International to 
deposit HKD198 million to the court within 28 days and to hold a shareholders’ meeting to adopt a 
resolution for Hontex International to buy back distributed or sold shares from about 7,700 public 
shareholders. In this way, Hontex International paid in total HKD1.03, making up for its irresponsible 
behavior two years ago. 
In some senses, China’s current securities civil compensation mechanism is not favorable for 
investor lawsuits. There are preconditions for suing companies involved in forgery: Courts must issue 
judgment papers for a criminal sentence or the CSRC and Ministry of Finance must issue written decision 
of administrative penalty to affirm the company’s crime of falsifying reports. In fact, few such judgments 
are made by courts, so only scores of companies have been punished. Most companies engaged in forgery 
face direct, public condemnation by exchanges. Many companies are condemned, but investors are unable 
to file lawsuits. Even though cases are put on file, investors face a chance of failure. Even when plaintiffs 
win the lawsuit, they cannot secure full compensation. Compensation of 40 per cent to 50 per cent of 
actual losses are already deemed as the best-case in such cases. 
The case of fraudulent listing involving Hongguang Electronic Industry was settled through 
conciliation, and only a few investors received compensation. In 1997, China’s securities market 
witnessed the sensational ‘Hongguang Incident’. To issue new shares and raise funds, Hongguang 
Industry fabricated profits, understated losses and concealed major items to swindle listing qualification 
checks. As a result, investors were cheated and suffered losses in the year of listing. With the release of 
an earnings report featuring huge losses and disclosure of Hongguang’s fraudulent cheating, Hongguang’s 
shares on the secondary market slumped dramatically, inflicting great losses on investors. In December 
1998, a female investor in Shanghai filed civil litigation in the People’s Court of Pudong New District in 
Shanghai, suing all directors and senior managers of Hongguang Industry and intermediaries for frauds. 
This was the first civil litigation claiming compensation in China’s securities market. After that, many 
investors joined the litigation on the grounds that they had been cheated by Hongguang’s false statements, 
made poor investment decisions and suffered great losses. The strenuous journey of this trail-blazing class 
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action suit lasted for years. As China’s judicial system did not cover civil compensations in securities 
cases, claims made by the plaintiff investors were determined to be inadmissible or rejected successively 
by the People’s Court of Pudong New District in Shanghai, the No.1 Intermediate People’s Court of 
Shanghai and the People’s Court of Chenghua District in Chengdu. Reasons presented by these courts 
were: There was no certain causal relationship between losses of plaintiffs and violations by the 
defendant. On 15 January 2002, the Supreme People’s Court promulgated the Circular on Relevant Issues 
Concerning Accepting Civil Tort Cases Incurred by False Statements in Securities Market, providing 
judicial interpretations for accepting false-statement lawsuits filed by shareholders. According to the 
Circular, investors may sue listed companies that have been punished by the CSRC due to false 
information disclosure and make compensation claims. The Circular restarted the Hongguang lawsuit 
filed by investors, and courts finally accepted litigation submitted by 11 investors. In 2002, the 
Hongguang case was settled by the Intermediate People’s Court of Chengdu through conciliation. ‘ST 
Hongguang’ and Guotai Junan Securities were required to pay the plaintiff investors 90 per cent of the 
amount in dispute (at a rate of 1:8), totaling CNY224,096. 
The civil compensation lawsuit against Daqing Lianyi Oil and Chemical Industrial Company 
went through a very different process: The initial complaint was rejected, there were no trials after 
acceptance, no judgments made after the trials and no sentences imposed. The number of plaintiffs and 
the amount of compensation were also lower than those in the Hongguang case. Factoring in lost lawsuits 
and withdrawal of lawsuits, the final compensation may only reach 10  to 20 per cent of the original 
losses. Daqing Lianyi was listed on the SSE in 1997. Due to false statements in its prospectus released on 
26 April 1997, in March 2000, the CSRC meted out punishments to Daqing Lianyi. On 29 March 2002, 
the day before expiration of the prescribed period for litigation, legal teams in Beijing and Shanghai 
representing 679 investors submitted indictments to the Intermediate People’s Court of Harbin in the form 
of a class action suit. But as there were no explicit clauses in the relevant laws, the court insisted that 
lawyers file lawsuits separately or it would not put the suits on file. If the cases were put on file 
separately, 679 investors had to pay litigation fees of more than CNY600,000. This left the lawsuits in 
limbo. Attorneys and the court did not reach any agreement for ten months. On 9 January 2003, the 
Supreme People’s Court promulgated the Regulations on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Incurred by 
False Statements in the Securities Market. Attorneys reselected plaintiffs that were qualified to file 
lawsuits according to the Regulations and reevaluated the losses of investors with new calculation 
methods. On 27 January 2003, attorneys went to Harbin and submitted the first class action civil 
indictment representing 107 plaintiffs; the court put it on file immediately. On 17 February 2003, the 
second class action civil indictment representing 274 plaintiffs was submitted and accepted on the spot. 
Before long, the court required attorneys to divide the two class action suits into smaller ones with 15 to 
20 plaintiffs each. This meant attorneys had to do their work all over again. Due to an overwhelming 
workload, the difficulty of implementing and lack of legal basis, attorneys refused to separate the actions. 
Six months passed without agreement on how to proceed. However, on 18 and 19 September 2003, the 
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two class actions were finally put to trial. On 20 August 2004, the Intermediate People’s Court of Harbin 
made judgments in the first instance. According to the court, Daqing Lianyi made false statements by way 
of fraudulent listing, inflating profits and other means, and investors were inflicted with actual losses by 
buying shares, selling or holding shares after the day the statements were disclosed (or corrected). The 
court determined that Daqing Lianyi must pay compensation: 459 shareholders must receive 
compensation worth over CNY8 million. As the sponsor for Daqing Lianyi, Shenyin Wanguo Securities 
failed to discharge its review duties and it had to bear liability for paying compensation for investors’ 
losses. After the trial of the first suit, Daqing Lianyi, Shenyin Wanguo Securities and five investors 
refused to accept the judgments as final and appealed to the High People’s Court of Heilongjiang 
Province. On 21 December 2004, the court in the second instance ruled that 464 plaintiffs in the Daqing 
Lianyi case must receive compensation worth CNY8.836 million, and that the underwriter Shenyin 
Wanguo must pay CNY6.086 million. Not until June 2005 were the first compensation payments 
delivered to 55 investors. On 1 February 2007, the five year case was finally closed. 
The Greenland case was deemed an example of fraudulent listing in China’s capital market. The 
criminal trial was full of twists and turns, so civil compensation is now still in the stage of prosecution. In 
March 2011, attorneys in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu and Hebei offered to be agents for investors whose 
interests had been harmed in order to claim civil compensation from Greenland Company and its former 
director of the board He Xuekui. On 2 December 2011, the People’s Court of Guandu District in 
Kunming, Yunnan handed down criminal sentences to the defendants. The court determined that the 
defendants had committed the crime of fraudulent share issuance and sentenced the Greenland Company 
to pay a fine of CNY4 million and He Xuekui to three years imprisonment with a three-year reprieve. No 
defendants appealed and the sentences took effect. After this trial, some investors started to seek civil 
compensations. On 31 January 2012, the Prosecutors’ Office of Kunming protested against the verdict to 
the Intermediate People’s Court of Kunming, claiming that the verdict was in error and that the 
punishments handed down by the court of first instance were too light, and that the court must determine 
that defendants and Greenland Company had committed crimes of illegal disclosure of major information. 
On 29 March, the Intermediate Court of Kunming made its verdict, and the ruling made by the People’s 
Court of Guandu District was repealed. The case was returned to the court of first instance for retrial. 
Consequently, the civil compensation case was suspended. After that, the Intermediate People’s Court of 
Kunming filed criminal lawsuits directly to the Intermediate People’s Court of Kunming, charging 
Greenland Company, He Xuekui and other persons accountable for fraudulent share issuance, illegal 
information disclosure, forging financial papers and intentionally destroying accounting documents. On 7 
February 2013, the Intermediate People’s Court of Kunming made the judgments of first instance. The 
court determined that Greenland Company, having committed crimes of fraudulent share issuance, 
forging financial papers and intentionally destroying accounting documents, was to be fined 
CNY10.4 million. He Xuekui was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with other penalties. Jiang Kaixi, 
Pang Mingxing, Zhao Haili and Zhao Haiyan were sentenced to imprisonment ranging from 27 months to 
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six years. During the legally prescribed period for appeal, five defendants, including He Xuekui, appealed 
to the High People’s Court of Yunnan Province. On 3 April 2013, the court made ruling of a criminal 
action, which rejected the appeal and affirmed the original judgment. The ruling then went into effect. 
Only at this point were plaintiffs in the Greenland civil compensation case officially compensated. 
2.3.2.3 Ineffective delisting regime 
The HKSE announced on 19 September 2013 that Hontex International should publish a delisting notice 
on 19 September, and be delisted on the 23rd (three and a half years after it was suspended due to frauds). 
According to the SFC, Hontex International’s prospectus released in December 2010 contained materially 
false or misleading data. By contrast, Greenland Company, though also suspected of misrepresentation, 
will not be delisted from the SZSE, based on the existing delisting regime. 
The SSE published its Regulations on Chi-next Listing on 20 April 2012.This document requires 
that companies whose financial statements contain prior period errors or false records, and whose net 
assets by the end of the latest year are negative after retrospective adjustment of the previous annual 
financial statements, should be suspended. Companies whose financial statements contain prior period 
errors or false records, and whose net assets by the end of the latest two years are negative after 
retrospective adjustment of the previous annual financial statements, should be terminated. These 
delisting provisions, however, are not effective enough to delist a company that goes public by cheating. 
The listed companies have made significant net assets out of the high offering price, and their net assets 
will remain anything but negative, even after retrospective adjustment. Therefore a fraudulent company 
can avoid being delisted, because its net assets are not negative. Take Greenland Company, for example. 
When the company was listed in December 2007, it was sold at CNY16.49 per share and its net asset 
value was as high as CNY7.39 per share. Even after its false reporting was exposed in 2009, its net asset 
value was CNY3.67 per share. Following the provisions on delisting from the Chi-next, Greenland will 
not be delisted. It is the same with the biological technology company, Wanfu. 
2.3.3 Measures of enhancing regulation on information disclosure 
2.3.3.1 Increasing penalties 
Article 189 of the Securities Law provides that an issuer that fails to meet the requirements for issuing 
securities, but gains the approval by cheating, where it has not issued the securities, should be fined not 
less than CNY300,000 but not more than CNY600,000.Where it has issued the securities, it should be 
fined not less than one percent but not more than five percent of the raised funds. Persons that are in 
direct charge and that are directly responsible should be fined not less than CNY30,000 but not more than 
CNY300,000. Where the illegal act provided in the preceding paragraph is instigated by the issuer’s 
controlling shareholders and actual controllers, the controlling shareholders and actual controllers should 
be fined according to the preceding paragraph. The listed Wanfu was punished in accordance with the 
penalties in the above provisions, which are too light. Article 161 of the Criminal Law provides that 
directly responsible persons who are guilty of fraudulent listing should be imprisoned for not more than 
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three years or detained and fined not less than CNY20,000 but not more than CNY200,000, or both. Still, 
the punishment is not severe enough. 
By contrast, the US’s Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act provide much harsher 
punishments for issuers and listed companies that violate rules on information disclosure. Section 17 (a) 
of the 1933 Securities Act makes it unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities (1) to 
make untrue statements of a material fact; (2) to make misleading statements by omitting a material fact; 
(3) to engage in any activity that operates as a fraud by the use of any means; and (4) to engage in any 
activity that would operate as a fraud. Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act prohibits any 
use of manipulative and deceptive devices defined by the SEC in the offer or sale of any securities, and 
provides that any violation creates criminal, administrative and civil liabilities. The Federal Securities Act 
states that any listed company that willfully violates the registration or anti-fraud terms of this title, 
commits a crime. Section 24 of the 1933 Securities Act provides that any person who willfully violates 
any of the provisions of this title, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under 
authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a registration statement filed under this title, makes any 
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, must upon conviction be fined not more than 
USD$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Section 32 of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act provides that any person that makes false or misleading statements in any application, report, or 
document required to be filed under this act, or the rules and regulations promulgated under the authority 
of the act, commits a crime. It also provides a maximum sentence of ten years, a maximum fine of 
$1,000,000 for a natural person and $2,500,000 for a non-natural person. The sentence and fines can be 
imposed concurrently. 
China should learn from the US if it is to revise its securities regulations and stiffen 
administrative punishments, increasing the proportion and amount of the fines and the severity of the 
criminal punishment, for example. This would finally deter those having the intent to violate the laws. 
2.3.3.2 Improving civil compensation regime 
If the person that makes false statements is held responsible for tort claims, we will be able to not only 
reinforce investors’ legitimate rights and their confidence in the securities market, but also regulate the 
offer and sale of securities and the functioning of the market itself. However, China’s Securities Law does 
not provide for compensation for civil liability, therefore companies that go public by defrauding 
investors usually receive administrative penalties, and the victimized investors receive no compensation. 
What is worse, the investors’ loss will be aggravated because penalties imposed on the listed company 
will incur economic costs and cause the shares to decline. Three measures can be taken to improve the 
compensation regime. 
First, the judicial process should be amended. The current judicial process for seeking civil 
compensation is obviously fraught with defects. First, the people’s court only hears civil cases of 
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securities frauds caused by misrepresentation, and establishes a procedural prerequisite that the act of 
misrepresentation should be determined by competent authorities. Second, a class action regime is absent, 
but in the US and UK such lawsuits make up the majority of the civil cases involving securities frauds. 
Third, a system of public interest litigation, like a securities investor fund, is needed to protect investors. 
Fourth, the current process provides for a general definition on frauds, but this does not answer the new 
problem in the market. Fifth, general rules on what constitutes a civil liability and how to calculate losses 
are lacking. The Securities Law should stipulate the necessity of granting reasonable compensation to the 
investors that suffer losses from frauds, how to hear civil cases of securities frauds, how to classify and 
define frauds, who bears the burden of proof, what constitutes civil liability, how to calculate losses, as 
well as other requirements for class action and public interest litigation. 
Second, civil compensation should take priority over criminal punishment. The purpose of 
prioritizing civil compensation is to uphold market fairness through economic remedies. The aim of civil 
compensation is to correct the economic relations distorted by wrongdoings through compensating the 
victim’s losses directly, while criminal punishment has the different aim of punishing and preventing 
crimes. From the perspective of securities market regulation, investor protection is more critical than 
criminal punishment and prevention. From the perspective of regulators, ascertaining criminal liability 
means a heavier burden of proof, more investigation inputs, and a lower likelihood of winning a case, 
because standards of proof for criminal action are much higher than those of civil action. A mature 
securities market will prioritize civil compensation over criminal punishment. Compensating the 
victimized investor is more important than imposing criminal punishment on the responsible person, and 
implementing civil compensation is a de facto penalty for the wrongdoing. 
The characteristics of China’s securities market demands long time periods before victimized 
investors are compensated. However, investors would be able to receive the maximum justice if they were 
compensated in a fair and fast manner within the legal framework. Lessons can be learned from the case 
of Wanfu Biological Technology Company making false financial statements, which produced China’s 
first compensation plan for victims of fraudulent listing. Ping’an Securities, the promoter of Wanfu’s 
IPO, established a special fund of CNY300 million to compensate the eligible investors who suffered 
investment losses from Wanfu’s misrepresentation, and recovered losses from the parties bearing major 
and joint responsibilities for Wanfu’s misrepresentation through legal channels. 
Third, a system of compulsory suspension should be established, which will pave the way for 
investors to seek civil compensation. At the very start of the probe of Hontex International, the SFC 
ordered a suspension of trading for the company’s shares. This was a sound decision, for the following 
reasons. First, the share price was locked in, which avoided dramatic price fluctuations as a result of the 
probe, and further losses for investors. Second, the sale was locked in, which prevented the directors and 
others that are responsible for the misrepresentation from seeking undue profit by selling the stocks via 
alternative channels (after learning that the company is under investigation by regulators). Third, the repo 
was locked in, which facilitated the determination and processing of future repos and civil compensation 
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claims, because the suspension came shortly after Hontex went public, when the investors subscribed to 
or bought the shares mainly based on the prospectus. Thus the causality between Hontex’s 
misrepresentation and investors’ losses was simple and clear. 
What stands in sharp contrast with the Hontex International case is that of the Greenland 
Company. The regulator launched its official investigation into Greenland in March 2010, and published 
a notice that the chairman of the company, He Xuekui, was arrested in March 2011. After that, 
Greenland’s share price fell dramatically, when the controlling shareholder, He Xuekui, managed to 
conduct stock securitization and transfer. There were doubts in the market that the declining share price 
incurred losses for the investors, but this enabled He Xuekui, who had primary responsibility for 
fraudulent listing, to make hundreds of millions through stock transfer. The root cause is that the 
Securities Law does not grant the regulator the power of imposing a suspension, or establish an advance 
security mechanism. In practice, besides the technical suspension imposed by the exchange during a 
natural disaster and technical failure, a company may suspend trading of its shares on a voluntary basis. In 
the case of Greenland, if the company did not suspend the trading, the regulator could do nothing. China 
should introduce Hong Kong’s Rules on Securities and Futures, empowering regulators to order the 
exchange to suspend the trading of any listed company’s shares. 
2.3.3.3 Improving the delisting regime 
If a fraudulent company is not delisted, it will reap higher profits than the costs of the wrongdoing. Take 
Wanfu Biological Technology Company, for example. Based on its prospectus, Wanfu, called Xianglu 
Wanfu LLC then, with the investment by its actual controllers Gong Yongfu and Yang Ronghua before 
2008, had a registered capital of CNY20 million. Later, with a series of fraudulent activities, it was sold 
as high as CNY25 per share when it went public on 14 September 2011. By that time, Gong Yongfu and 
Yang Ronghua together held 40,190,000 shares of Wanfu and had a combined wealth of 
CNY1.005 billion. However, Gong Yongfu was only fined CNY300,000, 1/3333 of his wealth. Now the 
couple has promised to undertake their compensation liability in accordance with the law, and put up 
30,000,000 shares of Wanfu in the China Securities Investor Fund as collateral for compensation. Before 
the compensation fund was established, Ping’an Securities may have made careful calculations, and 
decided that CNY300 million be the ceiling for compensation. At the current share price of Wanfu 
(CNY5.65), CNY300 million is worth 53,100,000 shares. Even after paying the compensation, Gong 
Yongfu and Yang Ronghua, who now have 80,380,000 shares in hand, will still have 27,280,000 shares 
worth CNY154 million. Thus they will make a profit 6.7 times their initial investment ((154 million − 
20 million) ÷ 20 million). Although Gong Yongfu has been arrested by the police and may be sentenced 
to prison, when he is freed in several years he will still be the actual controller of a listed company, still 
richer than a millionaire. 
Under the current circumstances, a system of delisting a fraudulent company should be 
established as soon as possible. The current delisting system should be improved, the relevant legal 
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framework be amended, and fraudulent companies be removed from the market. With an ineffective 




Appendix I: Sector Distribution of the 1351 Enterprises 
Listed in China: 1992–2007 
Appendix I is the sector distribution of the 1,351 enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges between 1992 and 2007, of which 816 are manufacturing enterprises. The appendix is made 
according to the sector distribution standards developed by the CSRC in 2006. IR is adjusted for the A-
share market index on the basis of the difference between the offering price and the closing price on the 
first day of IPO, and expressed in percentage. Issuing Size is calculated using the CPI in 2005, which was 
100, and the exchange rate between the RMB and USD on 31 December 2005, which was 1: 8.07. It is 
expressed in million yuan. According to the table, by IR, the 83 hi-tech enterprises performed 
significantly better than the other 1,268 enterprises at the level of 5 per cent (t-stat = 2.15; Kruskal–Wallis 
χ2 = 4.93), and by issuing size, the hi-tech companies also performed significantly better than the others at 
the level of 1 per cent (t-stat = 3.23; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 13.21). 
 Whole Sample  Shanghai Stock Exchange  Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Sector N IR Issuing Size  N IR 
Issuing 
Size 
 N IR 
Issuing 
Size 
A: Agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery 
36 121.49 13,943.06  23 109.14 9,324.75  13 143.33 4,618.32 
B: Mining 32 102.48 174,706.80  23 92.53 167,395.37  9 127.91 7,311.43 
C: Manufacturing 816 162.21 323,983.07  428 186.41 186,460.46  388 135.51 137,522.61 
C0: Food & Beverages 61 143.43 24,283.98  35 128.55 15,594.43  26 163.47 8,689.55 
C1: Textiles, Clothing & Fur 60 122.90 20,476.59  33 125.33 12,985.00  27 119.92 7,491.60 
C2: Wood & Furniture 3 54.74 1,223.44  2 67.54 1,014.28  1 29.13 209.16 
C3: Paper & Printing 30 132.09 13,012.80  15 170.11 4,939.30  15 94.08 8,073.50 
C4: Petroleum, Chemical & Plastic 152 189.84 51,891.13  76 252.67 27,347.04  76 127.01 24,544.10 
C5: Electronics 55 150.60 22,393.31  20 141.99 6,940.31  35 155.52 15,453.01 
C6: Metal & Nonmetal 128 115.53 78,945.26  69 114.37 54,311.22  59 116.90 24,634.04 
C7: Machinery, Equipment & 
Instruments 
222 166.37 79,097.27  119 181.58 42,110.76  103 148.79 36,986.51 
C8: Pharmaceuticals & Biological 
Products 
87 195.14 26,651.52  51 236.38 18,325.28  36 136.71 8,326.24 
C99: Other Manufacturing Sectors 18 348.49 6,007.76  8 608.04 2,892.84  10 140.85 3,114.91 
D: Producer & Supplier of Electricity, 
Gas & Water 
53 125.63 37,221.73  34 131.83 29,604.31  19 114.53 7,617.42 
E: Building 35 122.32 35,986.50  22 92.51 31,604.29  13 172.79 4,382.21 
F: Transportation & Warehousing 54 91.37 101,704.14  44 96.54 94,973.79  10 68.64 6,730.35 
G: IT 83 212.80 37,394.58  47 231.44 27,600.01  36 188.47 9,794.57 
H: Wholesale & Retail Trades 79 251.36 17,960.13  58 271.56 13,154.80  21 195.59 4,805.33 
I: Finance and Insurance 21 129.53 310,716.68  18 102.57 306,535.85  3 291.26 4,180.84 
J: Real Estate 38 213.88 16,805.48  23 290.96 11,505.60  15 95.69 5,299.88 
K: Social Service Provider 45 273.22 17,158.13  18 419.65 9,193.02  27 175.60 7,965.11 
L: Communication & Cultural 
Industries 
7 780.01 2,795.66  6 891.84 2,304.80  1 109.06 490.86 
M: Miscellaneous 52 251.11 9,072.92  31 297.32 5,418.94  21 182.89 3,653.98 
Hi-tech Enterprises 83 212.80 37,394.58  47 231.44 27,600.01  36 188.47 9,794.57 
Non hi-tech Enterprises 1,268 171.46 1,062,054.31  728 194.50 867,475.98  540 140.38 194,578.33 
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